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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics,
case studies, research papers, articles, and books. Our aim is to make these
case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the
needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world.
Michael W. S. Ryan’s second case study for CIWAG is a deeply
analytical and penetrating assessment of two challenges: first, how Jihadi
Salaafist groups recruit individuals to their cause; and second, how we can
stop them. Ryan’s argument is that to really disrupt the strategic
communications of these groups, we must first understand how they
leverage ideological frameworks to target vulnerable people. As a result,
his nuanced analysis of the methods used by Jihadi Salaafist groups
provides the framework for understanding how they hijack language and
concepts to groom and retain followers. Ryan also addresses the question
of how to inoculate against and repel these ideological overtures and help
the families and communities they target by examining deradicalization
and counter-radicalization programs in Saudi Arabia and Europe. For the
United States, he recommends the establishment of a joint publicprivate Corporation Against Ideological Violence, modeled after
the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Ever the pragmatist, Ryan also
discusses the barriers—both conceptual and institutional—that must be
overcome to ensure such a program’s success.
Classroom instructors should find the nuanced analysis of Jihadi
Salaafist recruitment techniques a solid foundation for why and how these
groups continue to appeal to diverse audiences despite battlefield setbacks.
1
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Practitioners and academics should find the detailed discussion of how a
public-private Corporation Against Ideological Violence could be
organized, funded, and be effective a thought-provoking and pragmatic
framework.
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. First,
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the
Naval War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made
to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately
responsible for the content of this case study.
We also have a special note of thanks for CIWAG’s senior editor,
Janet Parkinson, for her tirelessly professional editorial work in bringing
this complex case study from concept to full case study. Her good
judgement and intellectual rigor were vital at all stages of development,
from design to delivery.
We hope you find this case study useful, and look forward to
hearing your feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to the
Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval
War College.
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I. Introduction
We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures:
in imagination, policy, capabilties, and management. – The
9/11 Commission Report1
The vast majority of observers and analysts have argued that
defeating the ISIS ideology (or that of al-Qaeda) is a job for soft power.
The fact that all efforts to date have fallen short of the mark has not
deterred the search for the magic key to make soft power finally work in
this arena. The problem with such an approach is that ISIS treats its
ideology and military doctrine as a part of a relatively seamless
continuum. We need a new approach that attacks both in a coordinated
fashion. This case study will illustrate how the United States can avoid
repeating the four failures mentioned above in the war against jihadist
ideology.
The struggle against ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates has always
included two aspects. First is the close battle: kinetic operations conducted
by military, intelligence, and police, assisted by the activity of globally
networked financial institutions. The leaders in every aspect of the close
battle are clearly identified and, with the lessons learned over the years,
those leaders work to share information and coordinate their activities as
much as possible in a coherent whole. The second aspect is the deep battle
of ideas, engaged in collectively by the same actors and by other
approaches such as diplomacy and international aid agencies.2

“The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States” (Official Government Edition 2004) 339; https://www.911commission.gov/report/
2 Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, (2013) 3-5. The terms “close battle” and “deep battle” are
derived from briefings the author attended that General Michael V. Hayden (Ret.) delivered at
Jamestown Foundation functions. Gen. Hayden emphasized that in the leadership positions he held
at the NSA and CIA, the close battle, the battle of immediate life-or-death decisions, always
demanded his time. The deep battle, on the other hand, while crucial to prevent jihadist groups
from recovering from defeats in the close battle, was not a good fit in the time available to decision
makers or in terms of the subject matter, an ideology based on a religion and non-Western cultural
terms.
1
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The United States and its international coalition have prosecuted a
mostly successful collaboration on the close battle despite occasional
setbacks. This collaboration has not achieved all its goals and thus can
declare significant progress but no final victory. We should expect this
collaboration to continue even in the face of a reduced regional footprint
by the United States. The deep battle—the war of ideas against jihadist
ideology—has not achieved similar success, either at home or abroad. The
elements needed for the war of ideas already exist, but they are much less
developed and certainly less successful than kinetic operations. How can
this be rectified? This case study will chart a new approach.
The United States fights the close battle both inside its own
borders and internationally, country by country, in a networked coalition
of allies and partners. Its fight in the deep battle must similarly engage
within its own borders and simultaneously in collaboration with a network
of allies and partners. The close battle is fought differently from country to
country because of differences among national legal structures, military,
intelligence, and enforcement capabilities. We should expect the battle of
ideas also to be fought differently inside the United States from the
methods used by our allies, although with large areas of overlap.
Each member of the American coalition has a unique mixture of
history, culture, and government structure and thus must fight the battle of
ideas using its own best judgment, first within its own country and then
internationally as part of the coalition. Some countries are further along
this path, and most face greater problems internally than the United States.
Each international partner also needs to decide the relationship of its war
of ideas to its internal enforcement and intelligence efforts.
So far, the war of ideas has had two aspects: (1) devising
appropriate counternarratives to jihadist propaganda, and (2) thwarting
jihadist recruitment, either by counter-radicalization efforts to prevent
recruitment or by efforts to deradicalize those who have already been
recruited. The results so far has been mixed, as we shall discuss in the
course of this study. While developing a counternarrative to jihadist
ideology is necessary to help prevent recruitment, we should not expect a
6
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logical argument alone to be effective after full radicalization and
recruitment.
A war of ideas against a religiously based ideology, like violent
Jihadi Salafism, is difficult to define within U.S. Constitutional
constraints. Some critics have asked why we should focus on a radical
Muslim ideology when other violent ideologies have inspired fatal attacks
in the United States for decades. Moreover, unlike the war of ideas during
the Cold War, this new war is pitted against non-state actors who are
expert at manipulating ancient cultural symbols that are foreign to the
United States and the West in general.3 Unlike the Cold War, this new war
is aided by technology that allows anyone with a cell phone to bring the
war into our very homes. This war of ideas therefore must be fought from
the highest federal level down to the most local of all levels, the cell phone
of an individual adolescent.
This case study argues that defeating radicalization and promoting
deradicalization needs to be addressed within a new federal agency in the
form of a public-private corporation: the Corporation Against Ideological
Violence, or CAIV.4 This would be a presidential initiative with bipartisan
support, sufficient dedicated resources, and a clear focus on winning the
war of ideas against radical ideologies that encourage or demand violence
from their adherents. Although the primary motivation and focus of this
study is creating CAIV to defeat violent jihadist ideology, the
recommended methodology is applicable to any violent ideology and not
specific to a particular religion or set of beliefs. In practice, it should be
extended to cover other violent ideologies as well, whether based on
jihadist, neo-Nazi or other ideologies.
This case study will examine what we have learned about the
radicalization process as well as jihadist ideology and recruitment, first to
define how a war of ideas might best be conceived and then to discuss
3

Since 9/11, the United States has fought Sunni jihadist groups, the latest of which is ISIS. The
United States has hostile relations with Iran, which also promotes a violent ideology, but Iran is not
included in Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) stemming from the 9/11
attacks.
4 The proposed initiative is modelled on another federal corporation, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) in which the author served as a senior executive. Details on MCC are
contained in Annex B.
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how CAIV can help win the deep battle. It describes CAIV’s composition,
methodology, costs, and initial tasks.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States has worked hard to create
the basis for collaboration and information sharing among elements of the
close battle against terrorism at the federal level and between the federal
level and the local level. This collaboration and information sharing must
be formalized for the deep battle, both within the U.S. and internationally.
Best practices, research, and tools thus must be shared among international
and national partners in the collaboration in accordance with formal
agreements.
General information, strategies, best practices, and international
programs may be found in summary form on the Department of Homeland
Security’s website under Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and in
online reports from international institutions like the International Center
for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, the United Arab
Emirates’ Center of Excellence, Hedayah, and many others; but such
information is scattered across the globe and is rarely in a usable format.
Among the recommended tasks for CAIV is developing a new tool that
captures such data in an accessible and usable form—an information
fusion center, accessible to researchers, international partners, and
ordinary individuals alike. CAIV would also develop a national hotline to
provide individuals and families with online access to counsellors and
would create professional training courses for counsellors at the state and
local levels. CAIV would need grant authority and funding to assist local
NGOs in developing the capacity to help communities counter violent
radical ideologies before law enforcement becomes necessary.
This Case Study will develop its argument as follows.
First, it will describe the power of jihadist ideology in context.
This part will examine the meaning of jihad for the Jihadi Salafist
ideology. It will also identify the problem of dealing with nonviolent
“gateway” groups, which teach an ideology that can lead to violence when
an individual moves on to a Jihadi Salafist organization with the same
goals as the gateway group but on a faster timeline. For example, it will
8
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note the origins and development of Jihadi Salafism through the
collaboration of the nominally nonviolent Muslim Brotherhood in exile
and radical Wahhabi scholars in opposition to the Saudi Arabian
government and the official Saudi religious establishment. It will describe
the types of jihad before al-Qaeda and then how Jihadi Salafism developed
further outside of Saudi Arabia by al-Qaeda to become what one jihadi
strategist called the “global Islamic resistance.” Then it will examine the
innovative fusion of jihadism and traditional Salafism in the person of the
ISIS “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Second, it will examine the jihadist recruitment process and targets
developed by al-Qaeda and vastly improved by ISIS. Research confirms
the intuition that radicalization, whether within jihadism or neo-Nazism, is
the product of the “intersection of an enabling environment and a personal
trajectory.”5 This part will demonstrate how both ISIS and al-Qaeda aspire
to provide the enabling environment by recruiting and securing individual
and small-cell terrorists inside the United States without the benefit of the
large footprint that characterizes its activities in Europe. It argues that with
the loss of territory in Syria and Iraq, setting up cells in the United States
has become a high priority for ISIS. This section also illustrates how ISIS
translates into English or simply uses al-Qaeda’s English-language
manuals on recruiting and securing lone-wolf mujahedeen inside the
United States and elsewhere. It then describes the recruiting process and
how it was applied in the case of one lonely American woman in a rural
area. (Annex A has a more detailed analysis of the recruitment-tomobilization process.)
Third, it will make recommendations on how to win the war of
ideas against ISIS, al-Qaeda, or any radical ideology. The basis of these
recommendations is the establishment of a formal collaboration between
elements of the close battle, including enforcement and intelligence, and
elements of the deep battle or the war of ideas—both in a domestic U.S.
5

See Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for
Countering Violent Extremism, (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group,
2017) (Kindle edition) 76. Koehler is quoting from Fernando Reinares et al., Radicalisation
Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism: A Concise Report Prepared by the European
Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (May 15, 2008).
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context and as a wider collaboration among allies and partners who share a
violent ideological threat. This section will review first how this
collaboration grew in the United States, in part out of the Obama
administration’s presidential initiative on countering violent extremism
(CVE). This collaboration has been among the major drivers of the close
battle, including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The section then explores how
members of the international collaboration have conducted this, which
varies from country to country. Part 3 focuses on the domestic U.S.
collaboration on the deep battle and recommends establishing a new actor,
the Corporation Against Ideological Violence, a wholly owned
government corporation whose single focus would be on countering
radicalization in the deep battle of ideas both domestically and
internationally, while avoiding any duplication of effort with the highly
successful close battle waged by American military, enforcement, and
intelligence.
And fourth, the case study will describe CAIV’s makeup and tasks.
CAIV’s domestic partners will include state governments and CAIVcertified NGOs, as well as local communities. The purpose of domestic
partners will be to offer an alternative to law enforcement for targeted
interventions early in the process on the path to violence. CAIV also will
create a virtual network for willing international partners comprised of
centers formally established or supported by international allies and
partners after the 9/11 attacks. (It is expected that some of these centers
may also address ideologically inspired violence beyond the scope of
violent jihadism.) For both domestic and international applications, CAIV
will produce a two-phase approach that deals with current challenge and
future threats. It begins with identifying and addressing the consequences
of jihadi recruitment messaging and contents and also provides resiliency
training to reconnect individuals with social networks that provide a
bulwark against predatory recruitment. Additionally, it will introduce three
major categories of doubt about the extremist path an individual may be
contemplating: (1) doubts about the ideology itself, (2) doubts about the
10
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leadership and group behavior, and (3) doubts about personal and practical
issues.
The case study will conclude with a discussion of the creation and
funding of CAIV, the authorizing legislation for its governance structure,
and the special provisions afforded to it as a wholly government owned
federal corporation in the form of a public-private partnership, and the
decision to fund the effort for success through the Congressional
appropriations process.

11

Ryan Defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda on the Ideological Battlefield

II. The Power of Jihadist Ideology in Context

Figure 1. Rocket Launcher and IED Lesson (credit:Wladimir van Wilgenburg)
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Figure 2. Greater Polytheism and Lesser Polythesim Lesson (credit: Wladimir
van Wilgenburg)

Wladimir van Wilgenburg, a young journalist and scholar,
has been embedded with the Kurdish fighters in Iraq and
Syria since 2014. He traveled to several cities in northern
Syria witnessing firsthand the war against ISIS, including
the liberation of the ISIS capital of Raqqa. During June
2016, he was embedded with Kurdish forces who were part
of the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
campaign to liberate the strategic town of Manbij. ISIS
occupied and strongly defended the entire area. The SDF
campaign’s purpose was to sever the ISIS group’s strategic
smuggling corridor between Turkey and Syria.
Early that month, Wladimir visited an Armenian
church in Tal Abyad near the Turkish border, which had
been converted into a training center for fighters under ISIS
occupation, but came under SDF control in July 2015. On
the walls of one room was a series of white boards with
13
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lessons in blue, black, and red Arabic script along with
carefully drawn and annotated illustrations of various
weapons and ammunition. The military training was highly
technical and included the weight and size of rocket
launchers and IEDs with every part carefully annotated.
However, religious instruction was not far from even the
most technical military training. Several boards held lecture
notes on traditional Islamic topics like “the monotheism
(tawhid) of the names and attributes of Allah,” “the major
polytheism (al-shirk al-akbar)” that nullifies a person’s
claim to be a Muslim, “the lesser polytheism,” and the most
practical topic for governance, “the role of the shar‘iah.” 6
With its superior Islamic credentials compared to other Muslim
jihadist groups, ISIS has proven success in recruiting individuals and
building a vibrant network of both provinces (wilayat) that hold territory
and other guerrilla entities that do not yet hold territory.7 Despite its loss
of territory in Syria and Iraq, the ISIS group’s powerful propaganda and
military prowess as a terrorist group and as a proto-state make it
potentially stronger than any other jihadist group, including present day alQaeda. Moreover, the jihadist group’s ideology and organization integrate
its religious and military aspects: as we have seen, ISIS displays its
Islamic credentials even in classrooms devoted to military education and
training. Although the United States and its allies have achieved hardfought military victories, ISIS will likely continue to use its powerful
Islamic credentials to recruit and absorb new fighters to its cause, perhaps
under a new name and with new leadership. After losing territory devoted
to its proto-state, the group will no doubt wage guerrilla warfare and plot

6

Wladimir van Wilgenburg provided the author access to his copyrighted photos of the ISIS white
boards in December 2017. The author translated the phrases from Arabic, and any mistakes in
translation or description are his alone.
7 For an account of how ISIS built a series of provinces and affiliates outside Syria and Iraq, see
Bardia Rahmani and Andrea Tanco, “ISIS’s Growing Caliphate: Profiles of Affiliates,”
(02/19/2016), www.wilsoncenter.org/articles/isiss-growing-profiles-affiliates
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terrorist attacks, rather than the semi-conventional warfare that became its
hallmark.
The key point for our consideration of ISIS ideology is how
Zarqawi (the leader of the ISIS group’s predecessor in Iraq) set the model
not only for ISIS, but also for al-Qaeda despite its opposition to ISIS.
Zarqawi did not separate ideology from military affairs. The ISIS group’s
credentials in the person of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (renamed Caliph
Ibrahim) are thus infused into its ideology, which is composed of
traditional Salafi/Wahhabi religious teachings, modern extremist dogma,
and an Islamized guerrilla strategy.
Like al-Qaeda’s leaders, the wildly successful Zarqawi was not as
powerful as he might have become if he had been recognized as a
religious scholar. Unlike al-Qaeda, the organization he founded developed
the ability after his death to argue that leadership and religious stature was
established within one person, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The organization
took the time to argue—publicly, in Arabic—that al-Baghdadi possessed
all the qualifications of the original Arab caliphs, and when the time was
right after the fall of Mosul, they declared al-Baghdadi to be Caliph
Ibrahim. Al-Qaeda objected to this outcome, but too late; tens of
thousands of jihadist fighters flocked to the new caliph’s banner.
Even after the loss of its territory spread across the border between
Syria and Iraq, ISIS still exists—primarily because thousands have
accepted its integrated ideology. In the aftermath of American-led military
successes against it, one renowned expert has argued that ISIS’s remaining
strengths include “the power of its brand and its presumed ability to mount
spectacular terrorist strikes in Europe.”8 It does not take much imagination
to recognize that ISIS would desperately like to replicate that ability in the
United States to regain a portion of its preeminence in jihadist circles
while al-Qaeda “unobtrusively rebuilds its military strength” without
triggering an overwhelming American response.9

Bruce Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda’s Resurrection,” Council of Foreign Relations Expert Brief (March 6,
2018), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/al-qaedas-resurrection
9 Ibid. 3,7-8. Al-Qaeda has a current international presence of over 20,000 (not counting chaotic
Syria and fellow travelers). Hoffman argues that al-Qaeda is presently trying to avoid suffering the
8
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A. The Meaning of Jihad for Jihadi Salafism
Both ISIS and al-Qaeda use variations of Jihadi Salafism as their
ideology. 10 As its name implies, the ideology is a fusion of the austere
form of Islam called Salafism and jihad in the sense of religious warfare.
In Arabic, jihad means “struggle” or “effort.” Jihad in this sense may be a
spiritual struggle that has nothing to do with war. However, jihad in the
public sphere in modern times almost always means a war to defend
Muslims against attacks from non-Muslims and their apostate Muslim
allies. Such a war may be purely defensive or preemptive. To understand
jihad as a component of jihadist ideology, however, one must look at two
aspects: first, jihad as insurrection against all Muslim leaders, who have
now been declared apostate; and second, jihad as revolution against the
New World Order, led by the United States and its close partner and ally
in the Middle East, Israel.
Jihad as insurrection had its origin in the intellectual ferment of
twentieth-century Egypt with two pillars of jihadist history, Sayyid Qutb
and Abd al-Salam Faraj. 11 Because Sayyid Qutb declared universal
takfir—that is, no Muslim countries exist, only individual Muslims—it
followed that all nominal Muslim countries and their leaders were
legitimate targets of violent jihad. In addition, Qutb argued that no
legitimate caliphate had existed for hundreds of years, which by inference
denied the Ottoman caliphate any legitimacy. After Qutb, Abd al-Salam
Faraj wrote that violent jihad was an individual obligation. This point is
crucial. In the ordinary order of events, political and recognized religious
leaders called for jihad, and parents acquiesced in their sons’ participation
unless their own country was under attack. Faraj’s statement means that
individuals are obliged to wage jihad without official sanction or parental
permission.
The precise origin of the term Jihadi Salafism is difficult to
determine. However, as its name implies, Jihadi Salafism is the fusion of
ISIS group’s fate at the hands of the American coalition but that this “ruse” will eventually end and
it will return to terrorism in the West, presumably whenever such a course is feasible.
10 In Arabic, word order is not always significant. The phrase “al-salafiyyah al-jihadiyyah” may be
translated correctly either as Salafi Jihadism or Jihadi Salafism. I have chosen the latter in English
because I view Salafism as the basis for personal morality, governance, and law and Jihadism as the
violent and extreme variant of Salafism.
11 See Michael W. S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America
(New York: Columbia University Press. 2013), 26-44.
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the new universal concept of jihad born in Egypt and the austere form of
Sunni jurisprudence born in Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Islamist ferment
within Saudi Arabia’s religious opposition (1970–1996) became known in
radical circles as the “Islamic Awakening.” 12 Inside Saudi Arabia, this
movement was composed of the political Islam of the Egyptian and Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood in exile, tailored to Saudi culture, and the radical
teachings of fundamentalist Wahhabi scholars of the nineteenth century.
The ideology of Jihadi Salafism as we know it today emerged
among what became known as the Shaykhs of Jihadi Salafism in Saudi
Arabia between 1997 and 2003, the year the unsuccessful al-Qaeda
insurrection began in Saudi Arabia. 13 Because neither Bin Laden nor
Zawahiri had the formal knowledge or religious status to provide a
theological justification for al-Qaeda’s and other global jihadists’ actions
(unlike ISIS), they were forced to depend on outside theologians for the
religious theory to justify them. Toward the end of the 1990s, a group of
religious scholars inside Saudi Arabia, influenced by the Sahwa movement
but more radical, began to provide such justifications for these global
Jihadi Salafists.14
Jihadi Salafism as a violent revolutionary ideology was honed in
the writings of the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the
actions of al-Qaeda’s leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,
and the strategies of Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri. The
emergence of ISIS represents the ideology’s end point, which may prove
to be strategically premature after its conventional military defeat in Syria
and Iraq.
Saudi Arabia suppressed the ideology of Jihadi Salafism inside
Saudi Arabia and also defeated the al-Qaeda insurrection by 2005. The
ideology is alive, however, wherever al-Qaeda or ISIS has a presence and
inspires jihadists worldwide.

12

See Stephane LaCroix, trans. by George Holoch, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious
Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2011)
13 Saud al-Sarhan, “The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia,
1997-2003,” in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, eds., Saudi Arabia
In Transition: Insights on Social, Political and Economic Religious Change, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016).
14 Saud al-Sarhan, “The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi Salafism in Saudi Arabia,
1997-2003,” in Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, eds., Saudi Arabia
In Transition: Insights on Social, Political and Economic Religious Change, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2016), 181-206.
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B. Types of Jihad: al-Qaeda’s Perspective
The prominent jihadi strategist and movement historian Abu
Mus‘ab al-Suri separated jihadist warfare in the Middle East into three
major types or “schools of jihad”—local clandestine organization, regional
open-front, and individual or small-cell jihad.15
In classic local jihadism, radical jihadists form a clandestine,
hierarchical group that mostly operated within a single country. The
Fighting Vanguard group of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is a good
example of this school. The Fighting Vanguard fought inside Syria, its
only target, while the nominal Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leadership did
very little leading from exile. Al-Suri opined that this kind of jihad failed
in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco as well as Syria because strong central
regimes in the Middle East had developed powerful, modern security
systems. These systems allowed the central governments to roll up a local
clandestine group to the point that it was totally destroyed in its target
country.
Al-Suri referred to the second school of jihad as “open front.”
Open-front jihad is the form of jihadist insurgency that most resembles
conventional warfare. It involves a wider, regional, overt approach that
avoids the strict hierarchical cell approach and the limitations and
vulnerabilities of a clandestine existence. Al-Suri’s examples of openfront jihad include Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. This type of jihad
was fought on a global basis and, according to al-Suri, was successful
militarily and politically at least before 9/11.
According to al-Suri, after 9/11 the U.S. and its allies in Europe
partnered with the authoritarian governments of Middle Eastern countries
to develop a global system to defeat jihadists wherever they were, starting
with the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The
primary factor in the defeat of open-front jihad, according to al-Suri, was
the overwhelming technical superiority of American forces. The only type
of jihadist warfare that would succeed in this environment, al-Suri argued,
was what he called “the school of individual and small-cell jihad.” As its
15

See Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy, 207, 220 ff.
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name implies, this last school involves what U.S. pundits refer to as “lonewolf “or “homegrown” terrorism.
The complexity of al-Suri’s analysis is generally lost in popular
accounts. For example, he argued that if the correlation of forces between
the “Crusader-Zionist coalition” and the jihadist movement should
approach a more equivalent status, he himself would join an open-front
jihad. In other words, if the United States were to withdraw from any
theater of jihadist open-front warfare, the balance of power between
jihadists and its local enemies could shift in favor of the jihadist forces.
Both al-Qaeda and later ISIS concluded that the best way to encourage the
United States to withdraw its forces from the Middle East was to engage
in classic guerrilla strategy from terrorism to semi-conventional warfare,
not only in the greater Middle East but also in Asia and the Pacific, in
addition to al-Suri’s strategy of small-cell and individual terrorism inside
the United States and its allies’ borders.
Al-Suri’s analysis stopped in 2005 when he was captured by
Pakistani forces and handed over to the United States. The conditions he
cited for jihadist success in the open-front model appeared in Syria during
the Arab Spring, if only for a moment in historical time, but he was out of
combat in Assad’s infamous Sednaya Prison. It is worth noting that alQaeda in Syria (before the creation of the breakaway Organization for the
Liberation of Sham [HTS] in January 2017) included traditional openfront jihad, insurgents with conventional weapons, as well as its
clandestine subset that the United States called the Khorasan group, which
was charged with planning terrorist attacks against the United States and
its allies outside of Syria.

C. Jihad After ISIS: Fusion of Jihadism and Salafism
Traditional Salafism, like other mainstream versions of Sunni
Islam, views jihad as a community affair that involves the political
authorities of a Muslim state. 16 Salafism is relatively forgiving of its
Thomas Hegghammer has used the term “classical jihad” to refer to the traditional jihad
practiced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and “global jihad” to refer to the concept of jihad as an
16
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leaders as long as they are Muslims who have not committed major,
nullifying sins in public. In accordance with this tendency, Salafist
religious leaders generally support the concept of deference to wali alamr. Wali al-amr means “protector of affairs” and designates the authority
that protects the Muslim community from internal and external threats and
generally runs the affairs of state to that end, including the formal and
binding declaration of jihad.
Salafists and other Muslims consider jihad to be a collective duty
(fard kifayah). However, Jihadi Salafists consider jihad to be an individual
duty (fard al-‘ain). These distinctions are not mere esoteric details about
belief structures—they have immediate practical effects on all Muslimmajority countries concerning who has the right to declare war and who
has the legal obligation to fight and materially support a religious war.
Neither ISIS nor al-Qaeda accepts the concept of deference to the
ruler in matters of war and peace. As Jihadi Salafist groups, they both
follow Sayyid Qutb’s view that there are no Muslim countries, only
Muslims, and therefore there are no legitimate Muslim rulers who must be
obeyed. ISIS is the more radical because it does not recognize as Muslim
any leader, including jihadists, who has not pledged allegiance to the ISIS
caliph. Furthermore, only the ISIS caliph has the right to declare jihad as
an individual obligation for all who would be Muslim.
These basic elements of governing indicate the fusion of religious
and political affairs in which there is no meaningful distinction between
matters of religion and matters of war. This is important because it offers a
further demonstration of why ISIS cannot be defeated by either hard
power or soft power alone. Rather, it demands that the United States and
its allies attempt to frame the war against ISIS as a fusion of soft and hard
power, both conceptually and in practice.
The same analysis could be applied to al-Qaeda, although that
group has compartmentalized religion and ideology to some extent and is
not currently in a position to declare a caliphate. Like ISIS, however, alindividual obligation as championed by al-Qaeda. See Thomas Hegghammer, “Classical and
Global Jihadism in Saudi Arabia,” in Bernard Haykel et al., Saudi Arabia in Transition (2016),
207-228.
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Qaeda has a Jihadi Salafist world view, which anticipates that it will
achieve what ISIS has achieved, theoretically after securing a much
greater consensus and therefore greater legitimacy and wider support.

D. Hybrid-War Weapon
ISIS is trying to create a hybrid-war weapon out of the lone-wolf
phenomenon. This is not a new form of jihad but a refinement, aided by
modern social and other online media, of al-Qaeda’s doctrine on the use of
lone wolves and small cells for political means, rather than as individual
acts of revenge or rage.
To create the desired political effect, lone wolves and small cells
must appear to be a significant threat while eluding the police. To that end,
the ISIS group’s operations, explicitly based on Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s
strategy, when applied to the United States is to create as many
unconnected cells as possible that sustain themselves without any
knowledge of the details of the existence of other cells. Thus no cell poses
a security threat to any other cell; when police discover one cell, no other
cell is threatened.
When the cells begin to operate, they (theoretically) will give the
impression to the American people that the nation is under attack from
within by a large, powerful group, something a vulnerable network could
never achieve.
Jihadists are realists who have studied the United States for years.
They have great respect for American police and intelligence agencies.
They know that the likelihood that any cell will escape its first operation is
miniscule. These clandestine units will not be extensively trained
operatives, because such individuals would likely come to the attention of
U.S. security forces and police. The al-Qaeda security manual, adopted by
ISIS, is intended to give untrained clandestine cells a better chance of
survival, at least until their first operation. A major recommendation is to
look upon survival as a goal, something ISIS must realize is highly
unlikely in the United States or even in Europe, where the group’s
presence appears far more developed than in the United States. It would be
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an additional benefit if the existence of the English-language manual gives
U.S. authorities, other Americans, and overseas jihadists the impression
that such cells already exist, even if they do not.
The security manual’s theoretical exception to the no-suicide rule
inside the United States would apply to the individual who had originally
set up the small unconnected cells. Only that person would know about the
details of the cells’ existence. In al-Suri’s theory, the original recruiter and
set-up man, who he called the “builder unit,” should either leave the
country before he is detected or perform a suicide operation so that his
secrets die with him. With today’s technology, the “builder unit” would
not need to be inside the United States to accomplish his goals.
The last aspect of this hybrid-war weapon, which we should expect
ISIS or its successor organization to use in the United States, is its “virtual
planner” model. In this, the recruiter or a colleague becomes an online
advisor and planner of an attack by a small cell with a high political value
for jihadists.17

E. Lessons from The 9/11 Commission Report
The 9/11 Commission Report concludes: “We believe the 9/11 attacks
revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and
management.” 18 Imagination is not the same as fantasy. Imagination in
this sense is the projection of known jihadist aspirations, proven
capabilities, and likely threat into likely future scenarios. Imagination
requires creating the policies, capabilities, and management structure to
avoid or defeat the next wave of jihadist attacks on the United States.
Since the 9/11 Report, the United States has shown the imagination to
create a formidable set of tools for the close battle, both at home and

See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman, “ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical
Terrorist Innovation,” War on the Rocks website (January 4, 2017). The authors suggest this model
has been used in Europe and link its origins to the thinking of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri about
simplifying attacks so that virtually any motivated cell or individual could carry one off without
advanced training.
18 “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States.”
17
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abroad. The United States now needs to show some imagination in the
deep battle.
While important in the bigger picture, the Jihadi Salafist ideology
has had a limited impact on mobilization or recruitment to ISIS or other
jihadist groups. By “mobilization,” I mean persuading existing jihadists
and recent recruits to take a specific action, whether travelling to an area
of hot jihad, committing terrorist attacks in situ, or simply waiting for
future orders. I use “recruitment” to mean the process of inducing nonjihadists to join a jihadist group. This process may involve persuading a
non-Muslim to become a Muslim. (For ISIS, even nominal Muslims may
be considered to be non-Muslims or apostates.)
Individuals join a jihadist group for reasons other than ideology: to
protect Muslims from attacks; to partake in the romance of jihad; to seek
salvation through martyrdom; to seek revenge against the perceived
perpetrators of violence against Muslims; and a variety of other reasons,
some of which have nothing to do with religion, such as to earn money.19
In the ISIS group’s case, the establishment of the Islamic State caliphate
motivates foreign fighters and locals to join.
Once an individual joins a jihadist group, however, ideology plays
a crucial role in establishing group cohesion and identity. Ideology gives a
well-constructed justification for violence in general as well as for extreme
violence, which a recruit otherwise would find abhorrent. Ideology may
also be the partial basis for mobilizing a recruit to action or travel at a
specific time in the sense that ideology plays a role in a new recruit’s
response to the call for action. In short, ideology rarely acts as the onramp, but once recruited, an individual’s highway is defined by ideology.
Jihadi Salafism also underpins the long-term goals of a group,
including the establishment of an Islamic emirate or state and ultimately
the caliphate. ISIS has fused the war-making implications of Jihadism and
Salafism’s religious teachings into a single ideology personified by a
paramount leader, the caliph—and has rendered meaningless the
distinction between military dogma and religious belief.
19

For motivation to join ISIS, see Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside The Army of
Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015)
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To claim that ISIS has nothing to do with Islam is unsustainable
and certainly will not work as part of a Western counternarrative. Muslim
religious scholars have baulked at declaring ISIS to be outside Islam.
However, other scholars as well as laypeople and journalists have
compared ISIS to the Kharijites, the original partisans of takfir to
demonize and then murder those who disagreed with their radical and
uncompromising views of what it means to be righteous. Detractors,
including other jihadists, have declared that ISIS is the source of unending
fitna (internecine strife or civil war) among fellow Muslims, reminiscent
of the periods following the death of the last Rashidun Caliph, Ali. Even
before ISIS, Muslim religious scholars argued against al-Qaeda with a
combination of historical and religious arguments from an international
Muslim perspective.20
Developing an effective counternarrative(s) to Jihadi Salafist
ideology is problematic. In any case, defeating the Jihadi Salafist ideology
requires much more than a counternarrative. The United States has
developed increasingly effective and networked military, police, and
financial programs against jihadist threats. These measures address those
already radicalized and committed to Jihadi Salafism, which means
committed to violence. While the difficult process of ideological
“deradicalization” of individuals on a violent path is something that needs
to be studied, it is not the main tool for defeating jihadist ideology.
Defeating jihadist ideology means preventing the tempted from
buying that plane ticket to the latest hot jihad. It means robbing jihadist
recruiters of their ability to recruit by making the ideology unappealing to
its targets. To defeat jihadist ideology in this last sense requires
understanding how individuals become progressively radicalized to the
point of violence. To defeat the recruiters, we need to understand their art
and offer appropriate alternatives, which are the subjects of the next two
sections.

See Michael W. S. Ryan, “The Salafist Challenge to al-Qaeda’s Jihad,” Terrorism Monitor vol.
8, issue 44 (December 2, 2010), The Jamestown Foundation (website).
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III. The Radicalization Process and Targets
Alex was a lonely young woman living with her
grandparents in rural Washington state. 21 After watching
the horrifying video of ISIS beheading journalist James
Foley in 2012, she went on Twitter to “understand why
they were doing” such things. Alex quickly found herself
talking to people who openly identified as members of ISIS
and politely answered her questions. Soon she was talking
constantly to her new friends, especially one who claimed
to be an ISIS fighter stationed near Damascus. Her new
friends led her to ask about Islam, and her days were filled
with friendly conversations about Islam, Christianity, and
her life. Now the lonely hours were filled with supportive
male and female friends, who initially never asked anything
of her. As she drifted toward radicalization, another ISIS
member, Faisal, who lived near Manchester, England, took
up her religious education. Under Faisal’s tutelage, Alex
decided to convert to Islam. Afterwards she was
communicating with “more than a dozen” ISIS
sympathizers who sent her gifts, including a “$200 gift
certificate to IslamicBookstore.com.” Faisal advised her not
to go to a local mosque, “saying it was a governmentinfiltrated mosque.” Her new “friends” led Alex further
into extremism. Eventually, Faisal offered to send roundtrip tickets for Alex and her 11-year-old brother to travel to
Austria to meet her future husband. Her grandmother
intervened and confronted Faisal, and Alex promised to cut
off all relations. But she missed her new friends . . .
Radicalization usually begins with some form of recruitment
process. To understand how to counter the ISIS group’s and al-Qaeda’s
For more detail, see Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American,” New York
Times, June 27, 2015.
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ideology, one needs to understand the processes of radicalization and its
conjoined twin, recruitment.
Recruitment often begins with a wide-area appeal, the shotgun
approach, followed by an individualized appeal, the rifle approach. ISIS
excels at both. The shotgun approach for ISIS includes professional video
and audio productions on the dark web targeted at young Muslims,
broadcasts of speeches in Arabic translated into European languages,
videos of idealized life within ISIS territory, and what early Anarchists
dubbed “propaganda of the deed,” which may include videos of battles,
carefully orchestrated beheadings and other forms of mass murder, or
more prosaic sermons by religious scholars. For some, the shotgun
approach is enough to begin planning to join ISIS or al-Qaeda; for others,
especially those most needed by either group, the personalized rifle
approach is preferred or even necessary to seal the deal. It is also most
likely the most secure approach because the very process of individual
recruitment involves winnowing out unsuitable and suspect recruits.
Here, we will refer to two English-language manuals that represent
the ISIS group’s shotgun approach but also tell us a great deal about its
rifle approach. The first manual is about the ISIS-recommended security
regimes for jihadist cells based on al-Qaeda’s doctrine, and the other
contains a step-by-step course on how to recruit individuals for al-Qaeda
and similar Islamic societies at a time when ISIS was still part of al-Qaeda
as the Islamic State in Iraq, further discussed in Annex A. Like the first
manual, the recruiting course is based on jihadist strategist and historian,
Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s magnum opus, The Call to Global Islamic
Resistance (Da‘wah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah al-Alamiyyah).

A. The Recruitment Process: The Shotgun Approach
By the time al-Qaeda entered the world scene, jihadists had
developed a sophisticated understanding of the types of recruits they
needed and what kinds of appeals would motivate potential recruits. ISIS
learned from al-Qaeda and improved on its broad recruitment approach by
using social media and professionally produced videos. The most
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Ryan Defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda on the Ideological Battlefield
successful broad approach for both organizations was to emphasize the
injuries and humiliation wreaked on Muslims by the United States and its
allies. For ISIS, another broad appeal was to join the ideal Muslim society,
the caliphate.
The intended audiences for these shotgun appeals included anyone
who had suffered a racial or ethnic humiliation, real or imagined. Neither
al-Qaeda nor ISIS tried to appeal to those who had formal religious
training. They both preferred to provide religious training from the Jihadi
Salafist perspective as a kind of finishing school for the
radicalization/recruitment process.
The al-Qaeda system did not aim for walk-in recruits. Instead, the
organization generally insisted on a letter of recommendation from a
known and trusted sympathizer before accepting a walk-in. ISIS was much
more accepting of volunteer foreign fighters and developed a system to
identify foreign agents or at least make it difficult for them to survive for
long once they reached ISIS-held territory.
Both groups could advertise their appeals through online jihadist
forums to stimulate interest, which is still part of the shotgun approach.
But at some point the group would need to deal with individuals—always
a perilous step. Clandestine regional or country-specific jihadist groups
learned painful lessons of the dangers of the individual recruitment effort.
Without strict controls on recruitment enforced by the jihadists, security
and police forces in the Greater Middle East quickly infiltrated their ranks.
The United States, despite its well-publicized failures, has been very
successful using sting operations based on careful police work.
For some groups in the Middle East like the various Muslim
Brotherhood organizations that work on a long-term time horizon for
jihadist goals, recruitment is often a family affair or starts with young
adolescents before they are of an age formally to join a Muslim
Brotherhood branch or other gateway organization. For such groups, being
a member is a cradle-to-grave proposition. Leaving the group would mean
leaving one’s family. Betraying a group means betraying one’s family.
Both are very difficult propositions, but not impossible if an individual has
become impatient for action.
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However, these groups cannot always fill their ranks through the
family structure and must then venture outside. Reaching out to strangers
introduces the need for strictly enforced security measures to protect the
recruiters, as well as counterintelligence procedures to guard the group
against infiltration. Because Muslim Brotherhood–style groups in the
West have a history of hiding their true identities, forgoing formal ties to
Muslim Brotherhood branches in the Middle East, and remaining
nonviolent, they generally fall outside enforcement’s purview. The one
striking exception is a case in which such a group provided funding to a
designated foreign terrorist group.22 One author referred to this seemingly
tactical nonviolence of otherwise radical groups in the U.S. as “the
counterterrorism conundrum.”23
Al-Qaeda and ISIS have ambitious goals, no matter where they are.
Both demand large numbers of recruits, and both must constantly replace
attrition, create new affiliate organizations, and create individual or smallcell terrorist organizations behind enemy lines in Western countries. While
ISIS recruiting is much more advanced from a technical and social media
standpoint than al-Qaeda’s traditional approach, both rely on the same
basic principles for targeting individuals, albeit with some differences in
procedures. Many of al-Qaeda’s and the ISIS group’s principles and
procedures for security for individuals, small cells, and larger groups are
explained in the works and lectures of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri.24
In the United States one does not need to read Arabic to learn
about al-Suri’s recommendations for lone-wolf or small-cell
counterintelligence. ISIS adapted his teachings in an English-language
manual for clandestine counterintelligence under the title “Safety and
Security for Lone Wolf Mujahideen and Small Cells,” which it uploaded

For example, Texas-based Holy Land Foundation’s trial in 2007 saw all defendants found guilty
of providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (Hamas). The
prosecution presented evidence of the intention of establishing a hostile “Islamic Movement led by
the Muslim Brotherhood.” (Government Exhibit 003-0085/3:04-CR-240-G, U.S. v. HLF, et al.)
23 See Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010), 166-198.
24 For an analysis of al-Suri’s ideas, see Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy (2013), 193-254.
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in October 2015.25 The translator for ISIS informs his readers that, with
some modifications and updates, his course is taken from al-Qaeda’s
Course on Security and Intelligence, which was originally intended for
traditional jihadist groups. The ISIS manual also advises its readers to read
al-Qaeda’s English-language Inspire magazine for information about
building bombs and other tricks of the trade, the same magazine that
Tamerlan Tsarnaev read to produce the weapons used in the Boston
Marathon attack.26
The security manual’s technical content will not surprise anyone
familiar with standard government or private-sector security precautions.
For example, it stresses the supreme importance of maintaining vigilance
against host-country security services, practicing general information
security, varying everyday routines, and performing careful advance
planning. The manual offers advice on setting up a safe house, devising a
cover story, and safeguarding and transporting weapons, among other
things. If the reader intends to recruit members to his or her small cell, the
author advises using family members or lifelong acquaintances.
Its context is entirely different, however, from similar documents
in the West. The manual begins with quotations from the Qur’an and
examples from hadith and biographical literature of the Prophet. The
analysis accompanying the selections is intended to persuade potential
terrorists that preserving their safety is a religious duty. It gives radicalized
individuals permission to suppress their Muslim identities if that would
contribute to the success of the mission.
The point of terrorism inside the United States or one of its allies is
to produce a political effect that helps the jihadist cause. For the
mujahideen inside the United States, the purpose is to make the United

See Michael W. S. Ryan, “Hot Issue: How DAESH’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s
Threat to the United States,” The Jamestown Foundation (website), (November 24, 2015),
https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-how-daeshs-lone-wolf-guidance-increases-the-groupsthreat-to-the-united-states/
26 The Wall Street Journal’s Alan Cullison had access to Tamerlan’s computer (on WSJ
assignment) after the Boston Marathon bombings (04/15/2013). Cullison told the author of this case
study that Tamerlan was a “voracious reader” of right-wing extremists as well as jihadists. Personal
conversation, May 2013.
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States “pay the price” for actions against jihadists overseas and to goad
Americans to take harsh actions that may radicalize other Muslims.
Both al-Qaeda and ISIS have promoted suicide attacks as a costeffective weapon to use in battle or in places they cannot reach otherwise;
they will continue to follow this path. 27 Suicide, however, is not the
preferred tactic inside the United States in the long run. Nevertheless, the
manual stresses that the jihadist operating in the United States, with its
effective intelligence and police agencies, should not expect to be able to
escape to a safe haven somewhere outside the country.

B. The Recruiting Process: The Rifle Approach
“A lot of brothers—and (at one time) I fell into this
group—consider the idea of Da‘wa [recruitment] to be that
candidates who merely listen to a jihadi cassette or
motivating lecture, etc. will suddenly stand up and shout
out or say with motivation, ‘we want to be a troop and go to
fight against America!,’ without considering the gradual
stages which the candidate must pass through…”28
What the author is about to describe above is the painstaking way
the recruiter must approach individual recruitment to be effective. Such an
approach is usually time-consuming, as demonstrated by Alex’s journey,
mentioned earlier. After ISIS pioneered the use of social media, jihadist
recruitment of individuals became more cost-effective and secure, but it
could still consume a great deal of time. Potentially, any man or woman
with a cell phone and the latest encryption software and secure apps could

The manual begins with a clear approval of a suicide operation outside the U.S.: “I would like to
congratulate the Ummah of Islam on the heroic operation carried out by our brother, the martyr
Abu Dujana al-Khurasani…” The Jordanian suicide bomber’s given name was Hamam bin Khalil
Abu Mallal al-Balawi. Abu Dujana was the Jordanian suicide bomber who killed and wounded CIA
officers, contractors, and others inside Camp Chapman near Khost, Afghanistan on December 30,
2009.
28 A Course in the Art of Recruiting: A graded, practical program for recruiting via individual
da‘wa. The document’s pages are not numbered. The quote is from the first page of the preface.
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become a powerful recruiting center, if they know and practice the correct
method, which the course aims to provide.
The rifle approach to recruitment involves a slow start and
accelerates to a very pointed call to join a jihadist group. Calling the
recruit to join is not theoretical or some time in the distant future. The
recruiter is prepared to provide travel funds and is directly tied into a
logistical system through the traditional entry points for jihadists to the
Middle East, Turkey, and to some extent Pakistan. Sometimes, however,
the recruiter may advise the recruit to operate in place.
From media reports, we know that this recruitment approach works
on individuals who may never have thought about becoming a Muslim, let
alone becoming a terrorist in the ranks of jihad. A talented and
experienced recruiter, especially with ISIS, will choose the right candidate
and exploit their needs in a methodical way to exert a powerful yet subtle
influence over the course of his or her (often) young life.
If the recruiter chooses to influence a young American to pursue
jihad at home, the process may be very near to impossible to reverse. No
generic counternarrative will be likely to affect such a situation. There are
very few examples of reversing a radicalization process outside of a
controlled situation in a prison in which jihadists may be persuaded to
renounce violence. Even in successful cases, the reversal involves only the
realization that violence may not achieve the jihadists’ goals. The adopted
principles and learned goals are likely to remain.
To defeat jihadist ideology therefore, the best approach is to
intervene as early as possible—before the recruitment process is finished
and before an individual advances beyond stage one on the path to
violence.29 For some individuals, however, even then it may be too late.

C. The Art of Recruitment
For ISIS, as for al-Qaeda, the preferred method of recruitment is
ultimately personal. Shotgun-approach videos may allure those who feel
the need to redress Muslim humiliation when they cannot address their
29

For a discussion of the stages, see “The Behavioral Approach,” below.
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own feelings of humiliation in a normal setting. The wide approach may
also engage young men in the romance of combat on the path of “Allah,”
or even the attraction of living in the ideal Muslim society; some young
women have expressed the need to marry and raise children in the
caliphate under shari‘ah law.
Most people, however, need a final push from the personal touch
to make the decision to opt for violence in place or travel to participate in
the great romance of jihad. That final push comes from some sympathetic
person who is a guide with all the answers to the potential recruit’s
questions.
The personal touch, the rifle approach, also is probably necessary
to find a way to motivate the vital administrative professional, which ISIS
and al-Qaeda organizations always need and can rarely obtain. Very few
of these potential recruits will be motivated by the Jihadi Salafist ideology,
which becomes a crucial factor once the potential jihadist becomes actual.
So how does the personal approach turn radical ideas or extremist
dreams into action—into violence?
The second manual was an al-Qaeda production, which has also been
used by ISIS,30 that helps answer these questions because of its content.
Using the shotgun approach, al-Qaeda authors produced and provided a
manual for potential recruiters with the title A Course in the Art of
Recruiting: A graded, practical program for recruiting via individual
da‘wa.31 The dedications in the manual included the Islamic State in Iraq,
which was then technically part of the al-Qaeda global network.
Da‘wa in the manual’s title is the Arabic word for “call” or
“invitation” to Islam. For ISIS and al-Qaeda, Islam means Jihadi Salafism.
Every other form of Islam is a deviation for Jihadi Salafists, although alQaeda postpones judgment in most cases, whereas ISIS is quick to use the
For an apparent example of how ISIS uses this manual, see Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the
Lonely Young American,” The New York Times (June 27, 2015).
31 Thanks to Claire Weinraub, who brought the recruiting manual to my attention. The security
manual is available online by subscription at MEMRI and the SITE Intelligence Group, among
others. It originally appeared in a jihadist Twitter account before being taken down. Although the
document shows no author, the cover page indicates that it was collected and organized by Abu
Amru Al Qa’idy [sic]. The last page shows that it was translated by Abu Mujahid [sic] and Abu
Khalid [sic].
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label of “apostate” for any group or leader that disagrees with the ISIS
group’s claims to the caliphate.
The manual presents a course in recruiting mujahideen, or individual
and small-cell terrorists as well as foreign fighters, and also tells us a great
deal about the radicalization process and its targets. The principles are the
same for ISIS and al-Qaeda, but they have slightly different targets.
Al-Qaeda has a well-known set of targets, which its leaders and
essayists have explained over the years. Al-Qaeda traditionally does not
prefer to recruit individuals with traditional formal religious training,
because that would involve confronting what is likely a more mainstream
version of Islam. Jihadists would rather recruit someone without formal
religious training. Neither al-Qaeda nor ISIS wants to be forced to counter
what they consider an incorrect understanding of Islam. For this reason,
they may discourage a potential recruit from going to a local mosque. If
the target recruit is not a Muslim, the recruiter may offer to instruct him or
her and convert them online.
The recruiting manual does not use Jihadi Salafism as a major initial
part of the call to jihad. Since potential recruits probably have little deep
knowledge of Islam, let alone Jihadi Salafism, the ideology cannot be an
entrance point. Potential recruits often do have a Muslim identity, which
will be the starting point once a recruiter has identified a promising
candidate.
While the appeal of jihadism may play a role in recruitment,
recruiters are urged to show great patience in their dealings with potential
recruits. Jihadism can be used to show the recruit that he can perceive
himself to be a winner if only he would take the step into righteous
violence. He or she can travel to a hot jihad and make a difference in
redressing the humiliation of fellow Muslims, or stay in place in a Western
country to fight behind the lines. If the recruit has led a dissolute life, jihad
can cleanse him of his sins. If he feels he does not belong in an infidel
land, he can join the caliphate and perhaps participate in the Apocalypse to
usher in the ultimate triumph of Islam.
Of course there are many other more mundane appeals, which the
recruiter will find over time. For example, the person may simply need
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money for his family, which is more likely a motivation in the Middle
East. Or perhaps he or she is an opportunist living in an area where either
ISIS or al-Qaeda operates, and seeks a status or some benefits out of the
situation. Obviously, with the ISIS loss of territory in Syria and Iraq, the
recruiting job for foreign fighters becomes more difficult and would only
apply locally to affiliates unless ISIS or some other entity arises again in
historically Muslim lands.
On the one hand, recruiting lone-wolf or small-cell jihadists may
actually be marginally easier in one respect after the loss of ISIS territory
and the possible defeat of al-Qaeda and other jihadists in Syria. It would
not be difficult to argue that the United States is responsible for the loss of
the territory in Syria and Iraq claimed by the ISIS neo-caliphate. On the
other hand, reestablishing recruiter networks and a coordinated, coherent
message will take time for the core neo-caliphate without a clear safe
haven.
However, ISIS and its predecessors have shown great patience and
determination, while the U.S. has on occasion been too quick to declare
victory and lose focus on this peculiar threat. It takes little imagination to
recognize that the United States has done little to adopt policies,
capabilities, and the effective management structure to thwart jihadist
recruitment and ideological developments in the years following the ISIS
caliphate’s military loss in Syria and Iraq, al-Qaeda’s resurrection, and the
emergence of new jihadist groups.
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IV. What Is To Be Done? Go Broad, and Go Deep
Before we begin our search for counter-ideology tools, we must
acknowledge that jihadists, especially ISIS, have perfected the tools they
use. As expert as the United States is in the intelligence, enforcement, and
military spaces, we have yet to find our way in the counter-radicalization
space. With our tradition of freedom of speech and religion, we have
found the task of countering jihadism especially challenging because a
legitimate religion, however distorted, is the basis of its radicalizing
ideology. Americans have tried to ignore the religious context and power
of jihadism, and we have occasionally demonized Islam itself, rather than
identifying and attacking its aberration. Neither approach is valid, and
neither has been effective. We need a reset.
Just as jihadists have used the shotgun approach and the rifle
approach in spreading their ideology, the United States and its partners
need to address both a broader audience as well as individuals when
opposing that ideology.
Just as jihadists do not recognize borders, we need to transcend
borders in our programs to counter their ideology. In practical terms, that
means the United States and its partners need to combat jihadist ideology
locally, within each country, and also internationally, as a network. Such
an approach is not different from how the United States and its partners
have fought the close battle against al-Qaeda using intelligence,
enforcement, international financial tools, and the military both
internationally and, with the exception of the military, inside the United
States in a relatively seamless effort.
Just as we have worked to prevent or limit access to safe havens to
jihadists in the close battle, we need to limit jihadist recruiters and
ideologues’ access to physical and virtual safe havens.
The close battle has had false starts (Iraq, and the failure to
capture/kill Bin Laden early in Afghanistan), but we have improved our
collective game eventually (draining al-Qaeda of funds, disrupting their
central command and control, and taking away territory from ISIS in Syria
and Iraq). We improved the tools of fighting the close battle (drones,
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intelligence, financial networks, and cooperation), and so should we
expect to improve our approach and tools for the deep battle to defeat
jihadist ideology and recruiting—if we make the effort a priority. First, we
need to review what has been done, often under the rubric of countering
violent extremism.

A. Countering Violent Extremism
After the ISIS group’s dramatic loss of territory and a series of
horrific terrorist attacks by both traditional clandestine cells and surprising
individual attacks, European countries have reason to be concerned about
citizens returning from the killing fields in Iraq and Syria. Even if the
return is less than expected or the returnees are less interested in pursuing
violence, European countries still have reason to remain concerned. They
need to consider how best to absorb these citizens and how to deal with
the problem of home-based terrorists. In addition, law enforcement and
political processes are faced with the rise of xenophobic right-wing groups
and political parties.
This amorphous but powerful set of worries was reflected in the
2014 United Nations Security Council resolution 2178, which recognized
the need for programs to deal with returning citizens from fighting in Syria
and Iraq. President Obama responded to the issue by convening a threeday summit on countering violent extremism (CVE).32 The problem with
the summit appeared to be the vagueness of the terms of engagement and a
flaw in the concept itself: Who are these violent extremists? If the United
States perceives them only as Muslims, Constitutional and therefore
crippling legal issues are inevitable.
The fact sheet for the Obama summit cites approaches “to counter
hateful extremist ideologies that radicalize, recruit, or incite to violence.”
Although al-Qaeda and ISIS groups are referenced, the proposals could

See “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism” (February 18,
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-housesummit-countering-violent-extremism
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theoretically include any kind of extremist ideology on the left or right of
the political spectrum.
In the United States, CVE was intended more for communities,
with assistance from the federal government in facilitating local
partnerships and strengthening law enforcement. Recruitment of foreign
fighters is noted as a target problem. There is vague language covering all
the domestic and foreign bases, but CVE as a political movement has not
caught fire in the United States as it has in Europe and some Middle
Eastern countries such as Morocco and Iraq. Not many U.S. entities
beyond terrorism experts and university centers have focused on CVE as a
priority.33
Some U.S. Muslim communities joined the voices that were
concerned that CVE programs, despite their anodyne language, seemed to
be a thinly veiled cover for surveillance and police enforcement programs
against Muslim Americans. Other Americans criticized CVE as not being
forthright that the problem is “radical Islam”; still others ridiculed it as
ineffective, asserting it assumes dubious profile markers that allow experts
to identify those who will turn violent or fall for an ISIS operative’s pitch.
Meanwhile, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence have become
more effective in general and more alert to the potential problem of
radicalized individuals. The FBI website indicates that investigations are
underway in all 50 states about “Homegrown Violent Extremists
(HVEs).” 34 The website leaves no doubt that HVEs are identified as
“global-jihad-inspired individuals who are based in the U.S., have been
radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are not directly collaborating with a
foreign terrorist organization.”35 The problem for the FBI is that knowing
an individual has become radicalized is not evidence that this same person
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For example, the Center for Cyber & Homeland Security at George Washington University
created a “Program on Extremism.” See Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes, “Countering Violent
Extremism in America (June 2015),
https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20America%20.pdf
34 See the official FBI website: https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism
35 Ibid.
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will become violent. Having radical thoughts and speech is not a crime in
the United States.36
i. The Behavioral Approach

Peter Bergen has described an approach that the FBI takes, not just
for terrorism cases but for other violent crimes as well.37 This approach
was developed within the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) in the
division devoted to terrorism after 9/11. While the details are complex, the
concept is to focus on the behavioral process (as demonstrated by
research) that someone goes through from grievance to violence. This
approach does not depend on a perpetrator’s perceived motivation, state of
mind, or a specific radical ideology. However, as noted previously,
violence occurs at the intersection of an “enabling environment and a
personal trajectory,” whether that environment is a toxic ideology or a
criminal gang.38 The behavioral scientists in the FBI did not consider this
truism in their approach to the issue.
The BAU, in consultation with private-sector security experts,
developed a methodology to identify who will become violent, based on
how far they travel on a six-step pathway-to-violence framework. Factored
into this analysis are the existence of what may be perceived as inhibitors
to violence: a stable family, a satisfying job, etc. In plain words the
pathway may be described as: (1) a grievance, (2) the decision to act on it,
(3) research and planning, (4) active preparation (obtaining and testing
weapons), (5) dry run/surveillance of the target, and (6) violence. The
advantages of using this approach include the ability of analysts to observe
these steps, in part because of the phenomenon of leakage, which is the
36

Another issue with the definition, if one takes the term literally, is that HVE should capture other
domestic violent extremists in addition to “global-jihad-inspired.” This is not a problem of FBI
understanding the issue of home-grown terrorism, but the definition as stated in this context is
misleading.
37 See Peter Bergen, United States of Jihad: Who Are America’s Homegrown Terrorists and How
Do We Stop Them? (New York: Broadway Books, 2017), 233-243.
38 I drew this insight from Fernando Reinares et al., Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of
Terrorism: A Concise Report Prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent
Radicalisation (May 15, 2008), p. 9.
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ordinary by-product of the radicalization process. Individuals usually like
to talk about their new ideas and convictions and what they intend to do
about them. For our purposes, it is important to note here that step one in
the BAU process may be something as universal as boredom or loneliness,
and the enabling environment could be any number of ideologies.
Generally, families and the radicalizing individual’s social milieu
(friends, teachers, etc.) notice the changes that individual is undergoing.
The families may be part of the problem, or they may not know what they
are seeing or how to address it. Reluctant to see their family member or
friend arrested and perhaps prosecuted, family and friends may also be
reluctant to contact the police, especially in stage one or even stage two in
the BAU model. Although they may not trust the police for a variety of
reasons, they may however be willing to seek help from government
agencies or NGOs without a law enforcement mission that are ready to
help without threatening the family’s integrity.
For social service agencies or an NGO, using the BAU approach or
something similar might avoid two problems. First, they may be able to
avoid prosecution for the individual being radicalized if they can intervene
early enough. Second, the behavioral model cannot be reasonably charged
with a bias against a specific religion, as it does not depend on, for
example, targeting the sudden adoption of the most conservative Muslim
practices in dress or worship. If an individual’s actions show that he or she
is on a path to violence, every situational indicator would inform the
formulation of an effective intervention based on the specific ideology
(enabling environment), whether jihadism, neo-Nazism, some other form
of extreme racism, or simple criminality.
There will still be cases that avoid detection. Bergen points out that
the Boston Marathon bombers displayed all the steps outlined in the BAU
approach and, furthermore, that all “inhibitors” that might have prevented
the Tsarnaev brothers from becoming bombers had “fallen like
dominoes.” 39 For example, the brothers’ immediate family had left the
United States, and Tamerlan’s dream of improving his situation by
participating in the Olympics as an elite amateur boxer had been crushed.
39
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The Tsarnaev brothers’ path to violence was noticed by relatives and
others. Russian authorities had warned the FBI that Tamerlan had shown
himself to be radicalized while on a trip to Dagestan. FBI agents
interviewed him, but agents saw no evidence that Tamerlan was planning
an attack.
It is often noted that Tamerlan researched how to build the bombs
and remote detonators he and his brother used by reading the Englishlanguage version of al-Qaeda’s Inspire. Less reported is another
phenomenon reflective of a recommendation in the last stage of alQaeda’s A Course in the Art of Recruiting. Tamerlan’s reading exposed
him to translated selections of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s writings on
individual and small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines.40
Tamerlan was far along his ultimate path, but that path was not
straight. Alan Cullison, a journalist for the Wall Street Journal, was given
access to Tamerlan’s computer after the police had finished with it.
According to Cullison, Tamerlan, often portrayed as an unintelligent thug,
was a voracious reader, and in addition to jihadist material, he had
researched violent right-wing militia writings. 41 He is not understood to
this day. Most likely, he was deep into his radicalized world and far along
the path to violence by the time the FBI interviewed him, but still able to
put up a false face.
This is a cautionary tale. All we can do is reduce risk in hardcore
cases and strive to improve our understanding of the Tamerlans of the
world—if not of their psychology and motives, at least of their telltale
actions. Defeating future Tamerlans before their cascading psychologies
tip into violence—when coupled with what we are already doing in the
close battle—is the equivalent of victory over jihadist ideology and
perhaps other as yet unnamed violent ideologies. This victory is worth a
significant investment.

For more on al-Suri and the Boston Marathon bombers, see Michael W. S. Ryan, “The Boston
Marathon Bombing: Radicalization Process and the Tsarnaev Brothers,” The Jamestown
Foundation website (May 9, 2013), https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-the-boston-marathonbombing-radicalization-process-and-the-tsarnaev-brothers/
41 Alan Cullison, personal conversation, May 2013.
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ii. Radicalization and Deradicalization

Daniel Koehler, the director of the German Institute on
Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies (GIRDS), has written
Understanding Deradicalization, the definitive sourcebook on
radicalization and deradicalization from extremist ideologies, which takes
into account the latest programs and research. 42 Koehler, who turned to
studying the threat of jihadism after extensive experience studying the
neo-Nazi movement, tries to bridge the gap between theoretical research
and the practical needs of those who struggle against violence inspired by
violent ideologies.
The book is a comprehensive guide to deradicalization theories,
programs, and methods as they are today, and also a “who’s who” in
modern research on the radicalization and deradicalization processes.
Koehler recognized that government authorities cannot wait for theory and
research before they take practical steps to thwart violent radicalization.
While a major purpose of his book is to help practitioners devise programs
to counter violent extremism, it starts from the premise that one must first
understand the radicalization process based on well-documented empirical
evidence.43
Like the author of the jihadist recruiting manual, Koehler’s view is
that radicalization proceeds by limiting a target’s choices of political
concepts and values to a specific ideology, which ultimately leads to
violence as the only valid choice. He refers to this process as “depluralization.” The logical counter to this process is to persuade the
radicalized individual or group that there are more choices available.
Unfortunately, we live in a world of Jihadi Salafist recruiters, who, as we
have seen, choose their targets carefully and follow a very painstaking
path to lead them to radicalization and violence.
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Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering
Violent Extremism (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2017) (Kindle
edition). Koehler is the Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and Deradicalization
Studies and a Fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism.
43 Ibid., 5, 45, 65,74-78, 81-83, 89, 227, 294.
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The power of these recruiters is vastly enhanced by the new world
of social media, which, as never before, allows us to “de-pluralize” our
news sources and acquaintances to those who share our concerns and
ideology. The recruiter, using either the shotgun or the rifle approach, has
tailored the radicalization process to take account of social media and the
target’s weaknesses; because of this, radicalization becomes like a very
addictive drug that changes the addict’s brain chemistry to the point that
giving up the drug seems worse than death. The bitter irony is that the
perceived solution to all life’s problems is a single huge problem.
The experience of those who have tried to deradicalize individuals
or groups has not been encouraging. The recruiter following A Course in
the Art of Recruiting is counselled at every step except the last one to
abandon a target recruit if they fail periodic assessments. This is true no
matter how many months the recruiter has spent on daily and weekly
interactions.
Unlike the jihadist recruiter, a government official choosing to
abandon a radicalized jihadist would mean failure. The experience of
those who have tried to deradicalize groups in a prison setting in the
greater Middle East has generally not resulted in any of the groups (or
individuals) giving up their Jihadi Salafist ideology. The most that has
been achieved is what appears to be a tactical retreat from violence and
sometimes a separation from the radical group. Recidivism is always a
problem.
The challenge of counter-radicalization is to identify and intervene
with individuals early on the path to violence and encourage them to reject
it because of compelling doubts raised about the validity of the violent
ideology, practical doubts about the path an individual is contemplating;
and doubts about the righteousness of a violent group’s leadership and
group.
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B. Programs Outside the United States
i. The Saudi Experience

To get a sense for the prospect for deradicalization programs
applied to Jihadi Salafists in the Middle East, it helps to examine the best
of them, Saudi Arabia’s.44
Saudi Arabia began its program in the shadow of the al-Qaeda–
staged insurrection inside the kingdom. The Saudi program for radicalized
Saudi nationals began in 2004, and another facility was established in
2007 for intensive counselling before prisoners were finally released into
society, a halfway house between prison and freedom. Prisoners, some of
whom had joined al-Qaeda, including some who had passed through
Guantanamo, were tested and screened for candidacy in the
deradicalization program. From the beginning, the program was wellfunded and well-resourced and was adjusted over time to take advantage
of lessons learned. The Saudis who designed the program were often
Western-educated and included psychologists and security experts to
assess the candidates.
The prison program exposed candidates to critiques of their
jihadist ideology by world-class Muslim scholars. These scholars provided
arguments against the jihadist ideology including the use of takfir and the
proper role of the Shari‘ah. The most openly hardcore radicals simply
dismissed the scholars, however, and were rejected by Saudi officials.
Over time, the Saudis recognized, like most researchers
worldwide, that the aim of deradicalization should be adjusted to convince
participants to renounce violence, rather than the probably unachievable
goal of renouncing their ideology altogether. The Saudis also realized that
See Marisa L. Porges, “The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment,” Council on Foreign Relations
Expert Brief (January 22, 2010), https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/saudi-deradicalizationexperiment; see also Andreas Casptack, “Deradicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case
Study,” Middle East Institute (June 10, 2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalizationprograms-saudi-arabia-case-study. For an example of one former al-Qaeda member who was
released from a Saudi rehabilitation program only to join 10 other al-Qaeda members in an escape
to Yemen and there help found AQAP in Yemen, see Michael W. S. Ryan, “The Reemergence of
AQAP Operative Mish‘al Muhammad al-Shadawkhi,” Militant Leadership Monitor, 3 no. 7 (July
31, 2012), https://jamestown.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/Militant_Leadership_Monitor__Volume_III__Issue_7.pdf?x87069.
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a radicalized version of Islamic history is a component of the original
radicalization process, and so they worked to correct the candidates’ faulty
understanding of history. As incentives to reform, Saudi Arabia offered
candidates for release cash incentives, jobs, and even marriage, along with
a new family to reintegrate them into Saudi society. After their release, the
graduates are monitored to look for signs of any form of returning to an
active participation in or contact with radical organizations or elements.
The Saudi government has proven that it has been consistently
serious about its deradicalization program. Their program is state-of-theart and a valuable tool to increase our knowledge of the radicalization
process for confirmed Jihadi Salafists. Nevertheless, establishing success
in the deradicalization process remains elusive.
Recidivism rates are difficult to verify. The Saudis have increased
their original rosy estimates to an estimated 10%-20% recidivism rate.
Even the lower number still constitutes a significant security threat. In
addition, at least some, perhaps 11, individuals fled to Yemen and likely
participated in the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). We know that Said al-Shihri completed the Saudi program, but
fled to become the deputy leader of AQAP in Yemen, and in that capacity
oversaw the bombing of the American embassy in Sana‘a in 2008.
Further, we must consider the openly hardcore jihadists, who washed out
after the initial assessment, to be constructive failures.
On the flip side, we do not know with certainty whether the Saudi
program should take credit for all those who did not return to violence.
How many of those were not truly committed to their radical choices in
the first place? Some individuals are repulsed by the violence once they
have seen its effects, and some simply grow out of a radical orientation.
Of course, some may return to violence in the future under the right
circumstances.
It would be hard to replicate the Saudi experience in its totality
elsewhere. Few countries have the financial resources to devote to the
issue, and no other country, even in the Middle East, shares Saudi
Arabia’s political culture, which the royal family is uniquely able to
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manipulate without hard-power solutions. 45 Any number of Middle
Eastern countries, or any country attempting to deradicalize individuals or
groups, can and should bring mainstream Muslim scholars to prisons or
elsewhere to counsel jihadists on the error of their beliefs and actions.
However, we cannot expect such interventions alone to be successful
enough in the short term to rely on as a solution. Koehler’s findings agree
with the Saudis’ eventual conclusion that deradicalizing as a matter of
practicality and realism—within a prison—needs to aim at changing
actions rather than relying on a program’s ability simply to persuade
committed jihadists to abandon jihadist ideology. Furthermore, there will
be some hardcore jihadists who are beyond anyone’s ability to convince to
reject violence.46
ii. Major European Approaches

More than 40 countries have adopted some form of a program to
counter jihadist extremism through deradicalization programs and
rehabilitation programs within prisons.47 Currently, this responsibility in
the United States is spread among a number of entities that have a
counterterrorism focus, including Homeland Security, the National
Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, the Department of State, the
Department of the Treasury, and others. Other Western countries have
adopted other models and vary in where they place the responsibility for
counter-radicalization.
The Danish model, SSP (schools, social services, police), was
originally designed to deal with youth gangs; religious radicalization was
Although Saudi enforcement agencies do not hesitate to use harsh measures, Saudi Arabia’s
social and political culture is partly based on history and is partly a product of the ruling royal
family’s construction. In a system Stephane Lacroix refers to as “sectorization,” the royal family is
the only institution in the country that “maintains vertical relations with all the sectors making up
the field of power, and horizontal relations between sectors are practically nonexistent.” For details,
see Stephane LaCroix, trans. by George Holoch, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious
Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2011), 22-29.
46 For an early look at prison programs, see Andrew Silke, “Disengagement or Deradicalization: A
Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists,” CTC Sentinel, 4 no. 1 (January 2011).
47 Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization, (2017) 290 (Kindle edition, Loc. 7456).
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added after 9/11. This program has its home within the Danish police.48
The police set up mixed teams called “info houses” to exchange
information on potentially radicalizing individuals. These info houses
internally share information between the police and social services and
then perform outreach to schools and/or parents or others to determine
what kind of program might help the identified individual. Parents and
teachers can also initiate the action by coming to the info houses with their
worries. Because of the Danish culture and traditions and its relatively
small population, this model is reportedly very effective. Although these
conditions for success are not available to most countries, the concept of
info centers where police and social services can collaborate is worthy of
consideration.
Germany has approximately one-fourth the population of the
United States, but the number of foreign fighters supplied to jihadist wars
in the Middle East is estimated to be 800 individuals compared to the
estimated 129 foreign fighters the United States produced. The German
model is thus built to deal with a large problem—not only with the issue
of continued radicalization within its borders, but also with returning
fighters (estimated in 2016 as 270, compared to 9 for the U.S. by 2017).
Beginning in 2012, the German counter-radicalization approach has been
based on a public/private partnership funded within the Federal Office for
Migration and Refugee Affairs (BAMF) in the Ministry of the Interior.49
The Interior Ministry is responsible for state security, including federal
police and a Joint Anti-Terrorism Center, which provides information and
analysis for all federal police in its area of responsibility. BAMF provides
a hotline, which can be anonymous, as a first line of counseling for
families and others concerned about a radicalizing family member or
student. Once engaged in a specific case, the BAMF refers it to one of four
NGOs that provide counseling for such cases. Individuals may also
contact the NGOs directly if they prefer. While successful, this flexible
approach creates problems in achieving and maintaining equal standards
48
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of counseling. Germany has a one-week training course available for
counselors, but NGOs tend to follow their own policies and approaches.
Every case, therefore, requires a great deal of transparency and
communication between different federal partners on every decision
concerning treatment. The German model has influenced other countries,
including Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
The Dutch decided to build a counter-radicalization center from
scratch. 50 After a number of pilots, the government established two
organizations that work together: one for family support for
deradicalization and another “exit unit” for individuals. Unlike other
models, they were not built within existing enforcement units as add-ons
but were designed specifically for these tasks. Both units work in close
cooperation with existing civil society organizations devoted to the same
or similar work. All their counselors went through extensive training
before opening in November 2015. Because of the way the Dutch
government proceeded, its approach was likely more expensive than the
models that build on existing organizations. One positive aspect of this
approach was that the government planned a unit dedicated to the issue of
deradicalization, intervention, and family counseling built to government
requirements.
Traditionally, the French model was based on hard lawenforcement efforts without any soft-power attempts at family counseling
or support.51 Then in April 2014, the French government published a new
counterterrorism strategy that announced the creation of several softer
programs. These included specialized deradicalization facilities in prisons
and the introduction of a family support hotline. In 2015, the French
government also launched an online counternarrative campaign and in
2016 opened deradicalization wings in two prisons, staffed with trained
counsellors and psychologists to work on prisoners’ rehabilitation. These
new, softer programs were built within the government’s counterterrorism
infrastructure and were designed to provide intelligence to lawenforcement agencies. In addition, the French planned 12 voluntary
50
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deradicalization centers outside the normal prison setting. The centers
received serious criticism from a bipartisan report to the French Senate
issued five months after the scheduled opening, however—at that time,
only one had opened, and it was sitting empty. After just a year, the center
closed.52 In addition to criticism of their disastrous start, poor planning,
and underfunding, one critic asserted that the voluntary centers were not
intended for deradicalizing jihadists but instead were focused on
prevention.
Many other international programs exist beyond the space
constraints of this case study, and descriptions of them are available online
at various levels of detail.53 The examples cited here describe established
approaches of major European countries that would likely be among the
members in any U.S.-proposed effort at dealing with violent radical
ideologies.

C. The United States Today
In the United States under the Obama administration, the
government’s efforts at confronting radical ideology, termed “countering
violent extremism” (CVE) was a shared responsibility both domestically
and internationally. The Department of State pursued various efforts at
creating an effective international communications strategy, but it has
been largely underfunded within the traditionally strained State
Department operating budget and plagued with false starts.
Under the Trump administration, domestic and international efforts
under the banner of CVE appear to have a doubtful future. However, some
activities captured under this banner may continue in some form. For
example, in 2017, the Department of Homeland Security approved “26
See James McAuley, “France’s Deradicalization Centers Seen as a ‘Total Fiasco’,” Washington
Post (2/24/2017), https: //www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frances-deradicalization-centersare-a-total-fiasco-lawmakers-say/2017/02/24/218a8072-fa97-11e6-aa1e5f735ee31334_story.html?utm_term=.b06f98ff4680
53 For example, see the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Report, Countering
Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good
Practices from the OSCE Region (September 28, 2017),
https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/346841
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grants—totaling $10 million for two years of programming—to
organizations that will work to improve the security of our communities
and prevent terrorism.” 54 These grants were approved for local law
enforcement agencies, state and local government agencies, universities,
and nonprofit organizations. As one would expect, the grants are weighted
toward those aimed at helping first responders confront the results of
radicalization and prevent violence.
Other federal government enforcement and intelligence agencies
were given a role in the Obama administration’s CVE initiative, which
includes public outreach and information programs that will likely
continue, regardless of the nomenclature used to describe them. For
example, the FBI’s public information programs, such as its “Don’t Be a
Puppet” website or something similar, will probably continue, although
some groups have criticized it, among other things, for “perpetrating
stereotypes.” 55 Further, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has broad
authority to coordinate the U.S. Government’s domestic and international
counterterrorism intelligence programs. NCTC will likely continue its
coordinated outreach programs to domestic governments and communities
in a variety of ways, regardless of whether the CVE label is continued. All
of these entities use information and outreach missions as a means of
enabling their main missions of enforcement and intelligence.
Currently, with the encouragement and support of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, individual states and territories have
established “fusion centers” to coordinate activities mostly related to
counterterrorism. Because the centers are generally owned and managed
by large police departments, their purpose is to encourage intelligence and
information collection and sharing with other enforcement entities.
However, some of these centers, especially in larger states, provide
workshops and other programs that reach out to local communities and
organizations. Since they are focused on enforcement, they do little or
54

See https://dhs.gov/cvegrants.
See https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html. While apparently well-intentioned, like all of CVE, this
website has met with criticism. See, for instance: http://karamah.org/press/dont-target-our-childrenfbis-dont-be-a-puppet-website-in-schools-must-be-dropped
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nothing about the threat of jihadist ideology except in the most general
sense.
These U.S. enforcement programs should be continued. They are
crucial to supporting first responders and other entities on the front lines
who fight ideologically based violence with interventions or arrests. When
the radicalization/recruitment process morphs into support for or
commission of violence, however, the intelligence and enforcement
communities must always prioritize uncovering useful information and
intervening to prevent violence against individuals or communities.
The immediate threat of terrorism will always be the priority issue
for the close battle—and thus the deep battle of ideas will of necessity
always be a secondary priority in competing for resources and the precious
time of decision makers. Defeating violent extremist ideologies in the
deep battle may benefit from lessons learned through enforcement and
intelligence operations, but the war of ideas demands different actions,
requires different skill sets, and operates on a different, often longer, time
horizon. In addition, many affected communities and families may feel
more comfortable going to an entity that is not dedicated to enforcement,
but instead is chartered to help people understand the potential threat of
violence in their lives and communities and avoid the need for
enforcement.
Koehler and many other experts recognize that some individuals
decide on their own to reject jihadist ideology, but no one has a generally
accepted explanation for why this happens or how to replicate it.
Researchers know more about how individuals and groups become
radicalized than they know about how to reverse the course. This
conclusion is not intended to discourage research into deradicalization—
such research has many benefits, including learning more about how
individuals become radicalized.
On the other hand, if the United States sets a priority of defeating
Jihadist ideology as a way of breaking the cycle of continuous
conventional warfare against jihadist groups and preventing what “homegrown” terrorists, trying to convert jihadists by debating ideology in
person is neither cost-effective nor politically feasible. Research
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demonstrates that there are more promising approaches, such as family
counseling, as in the German model.56
As mentioned above, to be successful a deradicalization effort or
an early intervention should proceed by introducing three sets of doubts
about the path an individual is contemplating: doubts about the ideology;
doubts about the leadership and group behavior; and doubts about personal
and practical issues.57 Such a program also must be designed to hand off a
subject to enforcement agencies when an individual’s case analysis reveals
someone too far along the path to violence for a noncoercive program. The
tools needed for a national counter-radicalization—i.e., a counter–violent
ideology—strategy will be discussed in the following section.

56
57

See Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization, (2017) 291 (Loc. 7456, Kindle edition)
See Ibid. 148 (Loc. 3866, Kindle edition)
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V. The Solution: The Corporation Against Ideological
Violence
The sorely needed deep battle of ideas must address the
recruitment of individuals to violent ideologies and terrorism across a
broad spectrum, including Jihadism and neo-Nazism. The purpose of such
a program in the United States must be to thwart the radicalization process
by offering individuals, communities, and schools multiple alternatives to
their questions and concerns, involving both outreach and a one-stop
location for information about the radicalization process.
To address this, I propose the creation of a new federal entity—the
Corporation Against Ideological Violence (CAIV). CAIV would be a
collaborative public-private partnership within the federal system. While it
would collaborate with other entities tasked with the counterterrorism
mission, it would have the lead in counter radicalization and
deradicalization.efforts. The tools of the collaboration would include
research, education, information, communications, and cyber, with
enforcement as a backup. Because of the nature of this public counter
radicalization effort, CAIV would not include classified information or
sensitive law-enforcement information.
CAIV would need to be a presidential initiative with bipartisan
support. This would give the United States and potentially its allies new
tools and approaches, as well as creating a new collaborative international
effort to thwart the efforts of extremist ideologues to radicalize individuals
and groups. As a federal program, CAIV would serve as an example for
potential use or adaptation, both domestically and internationally. Its
shared data and shared research could create a learning environment in
which all participating countries could collaborate. It would engage the
deep battle first against Jihadism, and then against other violent
ideologies.
It is important to note that CAIV would not compete with the
counterterrorism community. Rather, it will augment their efforts, acting
as a resource to the enforcement and intelligence communities while
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benefitting from information gained by those communities about the
radicalization life cycle in the United States and other affected countries.

A. The Way Forward: First, Approach the Problem
Because thwarting radicalization must be a collaborative effort
involving the participation of both private and government centers, a
number of elements are needed to ensure successful collaboration. These
include shared pain, a convener of stature, a clearly defined purpose, a
common information base, a sense of movement, a formal charter,
committed leaders of stature, and representatives of substance.58
The first two prerequisites of successful collaboration in business
and government are the existence of a shared or common pain and a
convener of stature. The existence of HVEs in all 50 states is a clear
indicator of a shared pain, calling for collaboration on a national scale.
The federal government is the convener of stature and will ensure a
nationally consistent approach. CAIV will foster the collaboration among
the governmental and private institutions required for success in the
domestic context. The U.S. government also has shown its ability to lead
international coalitions, another part of CAIV’s mission.

B. The Way Forward: Establish the Tools
Two additional elements of collaboration are a clearly defined
purpose and a common information base. CAIV’s clearly defined purpose
is to defeat violent ideologies in the United States; its common
information base is the information fusion center.
CAIV’s information fusion center would collect and disseminate
best practices and research about how to counter radicalization by
attacking its root ideology via the shotgun approach. CAIV would enable
58

The principles of collaboration are an adaptation of those found in Mike Leavitt and Rich
McKeown, Finding Allies, Building Alliances: 8 Elements That Bring—and Keep – People
Together (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013). The author had the privilege to work for and with the
authors as a senior executive at the EPA. The importance of the elements of collaboration was a
significant theme.
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the collaboration of private-sector researchers, media, and IT experts, as
well as liaison officers on loan from government agencies such as
Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice (FBI) with missions in the “close
battle.” The purpose of the liaison officers would be to provide useful
public information from their parent departments and agencies and to
facilitate collaboration and de-confliction between the close battle and the
deep battle. The Department of State would be the natural conduit to
overseas partners.
As well as information produced by American experts, the fusion
center would include information translated from partner countries’
experts, such as Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, or Emirati scholars giving
explanations of terms like takfir from a variety of mainstream Muslim
perspectives and legal refutations of ISIS positions on violence, suicide
attacks, and other topical issues. The idea is not to create talking heads but
to have easily accessible and authoritative counters to extremist
propaganda and jihadist recruiters’ ploys. This would not be a passive
collection function but would be driven by the latest information and
research about topics with high payoff.
The bulk of CAIV’s responsibility, however, would involve the
rifle approach to help families, communities, and prisons intervene against
the radicalization of individuals and work to disengage potential offenders
at least from violence, if not from the extremist ideology itself. The first
step is to provide clear, authoritative answers to questions such as, How do
I know my child is under the influence of a recruiter? in an attractive,
accessible format online. CAIV would provide information to families,
communities, schools, and the U.S. Congress that would raise everyone’s
awareness of threats of online social media. CAIV could provide
releasable profiles of observable behavioral changes during the
radicalization process described as the “path to violence,” as well as the
process and methods used by recruiters to induce those changes. Such
programs require a national hotline with trained counsellors ready to
respond to calls for help. In addition to the national hotline and
counseling, CAIV would also provide information on specially designed
prison programs aimed at preventing recidivism for violent offenders.
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Other features would include links to established international programs
like Hedayah.ae, the English-language website supported by Dubai, and
similar international and American websites devoted to countering Jihadi
Salafist propaganda. 59 The Defense Department would be helpful in
community outreach in the United States because of its unique ability to
provide compelling evidence of the tragic results of jihadist groups’
recruitment in the real world rather than the mythical world of propaganda
and recruiting.
The tasks assigned to CAIV will no doubt change over time based
on internal and external evaluations of what works. Initially, we must plan
for a comprehensive center for countering violent radicalization primarily
based on violent ideologies, whether they be based on race, politics, or
religion. At the heart of CAIV will always be the information fusion
center, a clearing house for information about radicalization and
deradicalization based on open sources made accessible to the public in a
state-of-the-art, interactive website and drawn from curated sources in the
United States and from a network of international partners.
Internal performance measurements would fulfill the fifth element
of successful collaboration, a sense of movement toward clearly defined,
measurable goals. CAIV will need to define performance goals for each of
its tasks and design evaluations to create a constant learning and
improvement environment. To achieve truly meaningful performance
goals, staff will need to evaluate operations and continually correct goals
and performance measures. Initially, these measures would include
“output” (number of interventions) and “intermediate” measures (time and
cost of fusion center module rollouts); as CAIV becomes established,
these would be supplanted by, for example, the number of successful
interventions compared to the number of tips, and the relationship of NGO
activities to verifiable statistics concerning national trends in violent
ideological recruitment. It is vital that CAIV’s performance-reporting to
Congress and the public can always cite independently verified empirical
data to support its claims and that cost-effectiveness is prioritized in
funding.
59http://www.hedayah.ae
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C. The Way Forward: Establish Governance
CAIV would need a formal charter establishing its placement in
the federal system, the composition of its Board of Governors, and
covering interactions with foreign and domestic partners. In its authorizing
legislation, Congress should emphasize that CAIV is not a regulatory
institution and that its oversight functions are restricted to certifying
institutions and requiring independent audits and performance reporting.
Legislation should also require the Board of Directors to provide oversight
in order to avoid mission creep and duplication of effort. The best model
would be the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was
established as a corporation within the federal government but has
characteristics of both a federal agency and a private corporation. 60 The
MCC model for CAIV will allow for easier international collaboration and
a clear source of funding through interagency transfer or stand-alone
appropriations.
To succeed, CAIV will need to be a clear administration priority
and have the bilateral support of congressional leadership. To keep costs
down, to ensure a nimble response to changing trends, and to avoid a “goit-alone” culture, the permanent staff should to be capped by the by-laws
in a range of 300-350 at full strength.61 To attract clients within the United
States, CAIV should be formally separate from law enforcement,
intelligence, or military hosts. To ensure collaboration, however, the
Defense Department, Homeland Security, the State Department, the
Department of Justice, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
would need to be involved through seconded liaisons and membership on
60

Congress authorized MCC in PL 108-199 on January 23, 2004. MCC receives its appropriation
as part of the appropriations subcommittees that fund the State Department and foreign operations
in the House and Senate. Similarly, CAIV would need its own authorizing legislation but would
need to be funded by the appropriations subcommittees for either Homeland Security or the
Department of Justice.
61 The size and governance of CAIV is based on the author’s experience as a VP in the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC), which in 2018 reported a staff of 352 but is committed to reduce it
to 320 in 2019. Since 2004, MCC has signed 33 compacts with 29 countries and is responsible for
programs in 47 countries. (See Annex B.)
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the Board of Governors. To avoid interagency conflict and promote
collaboration where appropriate, CAIV (similar to the MCC structure)
would report to a high-level Board of Directors drawn from Cabinet-level
directors and prestigious private-sector leaders appointed by the President
of the United States.
The CAIV initiative will require collaboration at various levels and
within different spheres. Inside the U.S., CAIV would require
collaboration with state governments and institutions, schools,
universities, and affected communities, as well as federal government
agencies. Overseas, CAIV would need to collaborate with the appropriate
governments and potentially with existing institutions or centers with a
similar mission.
Collaboration requires representatives of substance, subject-matter
experts, whether on research issues, enforcement issues, or
counterterrorism issues. Successful collaboration also requires committed
leaders. Without committed leaders of stature for the Board and CAIV
itself, the program will fail to secure collaboration at a high enough level
with necessary partners, and it will founder. Stature in this instance for the
Board of Directors means an individual with a well-known public profile,
such as a Cabinet secretary or the head of a significant government
agency. The ideal Chairman of the Board would be the Secretary of
Homeland Security, with the Attorney General as Vice Chairman. Other
voting members could include the Department of State, the Department of
Education, the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center. As with the
MCC, the National Security Advisor would have a seat as an observer, and
the CEO of CAIV and senior staff would brief the Board on all matters of
interest.62

During this author’s 18-month tenure at MCC as a VP (2006–2008), he briefed the Board on
financial and budget issues for the CEO and observed a very high level of attendance (including the
Secretary of State herself) for MCC Board meetings, which were scheduled to accommodate the
extremely demanding schedules of the Board.
62
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D. CAIV’s Organization and Tasks
Initially, CAIV would act as a clearing house for information about
the radicalization process in the United States and elsewhere, along with
best practices learned in collaboration with our partners and allies, both
internationally and in collaboration with a variety of American
institutions, such as state and local governments, NGOs, and research
centers associated with universities. In addition, it would operate an
anonymous hotline as well as counselling services for communities and
families confronted with the radicalization of individuals. Such a hotline
service would provide anonymous or engaged counseling, as well as
interactive web interfaces offering information about the radicalization
process, the known recruiting practices of ISIS and al-Qaeda, and life
stories of those forced to live under the rule of the ISIS caliphate.63
Taking a cue from the indications-and-warnings culture of military
intelligence and the threat-management culture of law enforcement, CAIV
would create a series of indicators that an individual is on or approaching
the path to violence and develop a warning protocol to establish how far
on that path that individual may be, based on empirical evidence gleaned
from leakage. These indicators would be available to all partners, both
nationally and internationally.
Rather than competing with existing functions, CAIV thus would
alleviate some of the pressure on law enforcement to act on to every tip
that someone might become violent or is enmeshed in the web of an
ideologically violent recruitment effort. CAIV ultimately would take on
the task of intervention with the family or social environment of the target
individual through partners at the local level and then recommend a direct
intervention with the individual with trained counsellors or refer the case
to law enforcement when an individual has already committed a crime or

63

During the rise of ISIS, al-Qaeda quietly became more powerful as a network in the Greater
Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and is arguably a stronger threat to the United
States and its allies in the long term. This threat will manifest itself especially if the United States
grows weary of fighting any nodes in the al-Qaeda network except those that pose a direct,
immediate threat to American vital interests.
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is far along the path to violence.64 It would be expected that many of these
tips would come directly to the CAIV hotline, especially before the NGO
network is fully established.
Its workforce should be a combination of civil service employees,
administratively determined employees, and liaison officers on loan from
the military and other federal agencies. The administratively determined
positions would allow term-limited appointments of private-sector experts.
These AD slots could allow special pay grades as appropriate and ensure a
healthy turnover of expert staff, while the civil servant positions would
ensure a core continuity. A small team of subject matter experts and very
experienced federal government and private-sector employees would be
required in the initial planning stage to avoid the usual difficulties and
enhance CAIV’s effectiveness.

Figure 3. CAIV Organization Chart

64

CAIV should take cases only when an individual is in the first or at most the second stage on the
path to violence. Counsellors would need to be given protocols for when to engage and disengage
in any individual case. The fusion center would allow anonymity for anyone seeking information
but who has not decided to engage counselling services either online or in person.
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When fully established, CAIV would undertake eight main tasks:
(1) creating and maintaining an information fusion center; (2) establishing
a national hotline to provide information and expert counselling services;
(3) creating a nationwide deradicalization network; (4) acting as liaison
with U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military; (5) liaising with
foreign counter-radicalization institutions; (6) publicizing and promoting
current research; (7) providing research grants; and (8) establishing policy,
planning, and evaluation guidelines.
Create and maintain an information fusion center. The CIO would be
responsible for maintaining a data clearinghouse, or information fusion
center, which would be a curated database of information on violent
ideologies. The CAIV VP for Research would be responsible for its
research content. The fusion center would provide links to unclassified
information produced by CAIV, other federal agencies, universities, and
NGOs, which would be available to both domestic and internationalpartner organizations. It would include empirical information on known
recruiting efforts by members of violent ideologies inside the United
States, as well as information about gateway ideologies and any
organizations that are specific targets for recruitment by groups or
individuals espousing a violent ideology. The fusion center would also
include information for domestic consumption on how to get counseling
and other help, either locally or from CAIV experts, for the victims of
violent ideological recruitment.
Train and provide counselors via a national hotline. The CAIV VP for
National Hotline, Counseling, and Training would create and manage a
national counter-radicalization hotline available to affected families,
communities, and individuals. Because “leakage” is a critical avenue to
identify an individual in crisis, the hotline would be key to giving families,
teachers, and friends a resource at an early stage of a loved one’s
radicalization, before law enforcement becomes necessary. This
department would be also responsible for the availability of counseling
services, both via phone and online, and would train new counselors for
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the hotline. It would also design and provide nationally available courses
on counseling families, individuals, and communities on relevant subjects.
These courses would be part of the certification process for NGOs and
others that would eventually provide counselling locally. Such training
courses and follow-up performance audits would ensure uniformity of
standards and procedures. The CIO would be responsible for the hotline’s
technical needs, including designing new applications to improve its
performance and keep current with the latest technological developments.
The design for the fusion center and hotline would be among the
first tasks in the creation of CAIV, which would use best practices for
modular design and rollout testing. Because CAIV would be subject to
daily hacking attempts, the CIO would require support from Homeland
Security and the private sector to ensure the highest standards for
computer security.
Create a nationwide NGO network for deradicalization. This VP would
also be responsible for creating and certifying a national network of NGOs
to work with local communities, families, and schools to perform counterradicalization interventions for recruits being targeted by a violent
ideology. NGOs that currently operate suicide hotlines or other support
services are likely initial candidates. Initially, these organizations would
self-identify by applying for support grants administered by CAIV similar
to the grants currently offered by Homeland Security, although CAIV
grants would be focused on non-enforcement entities.
NGOs and government entities in the network must include
mandatory evaluations and performance measures to create a feedback
loop for improving performance. This does not mean treating each case
identically; rather, it entails using standardized protocols across the
network for communication and initial analysis of a potential case.
Provide liaison with U.S. enforcement, intelligence, and military. The
CAIV VP for Liaison, Community Outreach, & International Affairs
would be responsible for liaison with all CAIV partners, including other
federal government civilian agencies, the U.S. military, and individual
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states. The liaison would include creating points of contact with Homeland
Security’s approved enforcement fusion centers to ensure that information
about programs, activities, lessons learned, and new threats flows laterally
between organizations, across states, and down to all levels.
Provide liaison with foreign institutions that counter radicalization. The
CAIV VP for Liaison would also be responsible for communication with
international programs in coordination with the State Department. Liaison
would include both virtual and in-person meetings with international
partners to facilitate information-sharing on potential collaboration on
common concerns. CAIV would not maintain an overseas footprint.
Promote and publicize results of research on radicalization and
deradicalization. The CAIV VP for Research would ensure that all CAIV
offices and network members are informed of the latest academic research
on the radicalization process, best practices in deradicalization programs
in prisons, and counter-radicalization interventions outside the
enforcement process. The VP for Congressional and Public Affairs would
offer a selection of this same information to the news media and on social
media, and respond to the information needs of the U.S Congress.
The VP for Research would also recommend competitive research
grants to universities and large NGOs to encourage and enable privatesector research on topics related to CAIV’s mission. Because of the
technical nature of these grants, the VP for Research would be responsible
for developing the terms of grant offers, receiving grant applications, and
presenting/explaining the grant applications, as described below.
Provide grants to NGOs, universities, and other research centers. CAIV
grants would support the creation and maintenance of the CAIV network
within the United States, as well as fund research projects on topics related
to radicalization, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization. All grants
would require performance data. The CAIV CFO would oversee the
grants’ financial and technical management and ensure that performance62

Ryan Defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda on the Ideological Battlefield
reporting requirements were not burdensome, were written in plain
English, and were sufficient for providing information to Congress.
The VP for the National Hotline would solicit grant applications
from NGOs and universities to provide CAIV-certified counselling
services at the local level. Such grants would be necessary initially,
especially in less affluent locales. Such grants would be for a multi-year
start-up period and the NGOs would be expected to attract private
financing to supplement and ideally replace CAIV funding.
Competitive grants would be recommended by a standing
investment committee composed of all VP and C-level executives, chaired
by its deputy CEO. The deputy CEO would forward the investment
committee’s recommendations to the CAIV CEO, who would make the
final decision.
Establish policy, planning, and evaluation guidelines. The department of
the VP for Policy, Planning, and Evaluation (PP&E) would formulate
policy recommendations for the CEO to improve CAIV’s overall
effectiveness. This department would draft CAIV’s strategic plan, based
on input from the rest of the corporation and the results of independent
performance evaluation of its programs. It would also be responsible for
reviewing performance indicators and performance measures for all
aspects of CAIV’s work, including the fusion center, the national hotline,
certified local NGOs, and the grant program. PP&E would work with the
Research Office to determine what statistics should be tracked and
analyzed and which successes or failures of domestic and international
partners should inform CAIV’s policies and procedures. It also would help
ensure that budget requests and allocations include performance measures.

E. Inherent Difficulties, and Their Solutions
Establishing the Corporation Against Ideological Violence does
pose some difficulties, some of which are the natural result of a
centralized agency that must depend on decentralized execution.
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The first is the difficulty of maintaining high standards among
NGOs and other network partners that provide counselling. To address the
tendency to entropy in a large system, CAIV would need to provide
positive leverage by creating a system of certified institutions as federally
approved counselors. The certification would require standard training for
counselors coupled with scheduled performance and fiscal audits to
maintain the certification. CAIV could also certify experienced local
institutions, especially universities, to train counselors employed by
NGOs. Independent audits are crucial to this end. All of CAIV’s offices
would cooperate with the Inspector General (IG) in its oversight role over
their specific functions. However, the CFO would take the lead on
supporting annual financial audits, and Policy, Planning and Evaluation
would take the lead on performance audits. Training courses for network
partners would include information about preparing for and cooperating
with audits. Pre-audit consultations would be carried out as necessary. The
IG would not inspect all network partners on an annual basis, but would
audit individual grant recipients on a discretionary basis.
Another difficulty is the tendency for bureaucracies to multiply
requirements and rules, which creates increased overhead costs and
potentially slows down delivery of services. The counter to this lies in
CAIV’s authorizing legislation. To avoid administrative bloat, legislation
should require that general services like payroll, facilities, and the services
of the IG be provided by the appropriate large government departments.
For example, the Homeland Security IG could provide government audits
for CAIV. Perhaps the most important counter to the usual bureaucratic
difficulties will be a carefully detailed design.
At the international level, CAIV’s two major difficulties will be (1)
convincing other countries that formal collaboration is in everyone’s
interests; and (2) ensuring that its international efforts are closely
coordinated with and mutually supportive of other federal efforts. Taken
together, Islam’s long history, the complexities of jihadist ideology, the
near-universal reach of social media, and the proliferation of the ISIS
group’s and al-Qaeda’s affiliates argue that the problem of defeating
jihadist ideology are beyond any individual country’s ability, even with
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the United States’ significant resources globally or Saudi Arabia’s
regionally. The issue requires the combined and coordinated efforts of all
affected countries. In parallel with this international effort, each country
needs to coordinate the efforts of all the appropriate government agencies
to address the problem of modern extremist ideology based on a distorted
version of traditional Islam.
The United States must recognize that it is joining a series of
international conversations, not creating one. CAIV would work to attract
other international programs rather than push its own program on others.
Including information from other nations in the information fusion center
is one way to get their attention and potentially approbation. Avoiding
conflict with other U.S. programs will be accomplished through
transparency, formal inter-agency agreements, and CAIV’s governance
structure. Of course, CAIV should operate within the parameters of
comprehensive national counterterrorism and law enforcement strategies
and foreign policy.
Timing and resources are crucially linked. With sufficient
resources, the small planning team mentioned above can create a
strategically planned rollout, which involves identifying the timing and
impact of each aspect of CAIV. For example, the initial task would be to
plan the design and rollout of the fusion center in separable modules,
followed by designs for the rollout of the help hotline, and so on. One of
the most important tasks would be estimating the cost of creating and
maintaining the IT aspects of the fusion center and the hotline.65
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Administrating funding for an end-state of approximately a 320 strong workforce would likely
mirror MCC’s annual administrative budget without overseas operations, which is projected to be
approximately $94 million for 2019, of which approximately $55 million accounts for human
capital costs.
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Figure 4. Proposed CAIV Budget. Basis for costs: Congressional CR for MCC ($899
million) in 2018, adjusted for CAIV domestic variance and lack of requirement for large
foreign aid budget. Note: Information Technology assumes staged modular
implementation; all estimates would be adjusted annually.
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VI. Conclusion
Hard power alone cannot destroy jihadist ideology. When we
finish destroying their safe haven of the moment and killing their latest
leaders, they begin again. The United States needs a new approach to the
deep battle, to be coordinated internationally and at home with the hardpower tools that have been successful in the close battle.
The jihadists’ aim, both internationally and within the United
States, is the radicalization of individuals and groups to accept the Jihadi
Salafist ideology and attack the priority targets identified by a small but
growing group of jihadist ideologues. Without recruits, their ideology has
no impact. Destroying the ability of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Jihadist
groups to radicalize individuals will also destroy Jihadi Salafism by
turning it into an historic footnote rather than the clear and present danger
it now is.
Establishing the Corporation Against Ideological Violence will
enable the United Sates to put best practices into use and attack the
problem of violent extremist ideology in the deep battle of ideas.

Discussion Questions
Institutional Issues
1. One model for CAIV outreach may be similar to public health
interventions. What would a community-level intervention look
like in your immediate community? How would it differ from the
community you grew up in? Why?
2. Given concerns about privacy and private data, what assurances
should CAIV provide its partnership network about how
information would be used by government agencies?
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3. If you were helping to stand up CAIV, what would the most
important priorities be for the first 12 months, three years, and 10
years? What would be signs that CAIV is fulfilling its mission?
What would be signs that CAIV needs to adjust its priorities? How
could CAIV balance its domestic and international outreach?
Crafting Messages
1. What are “positive” messages for this target audience, and how
limited or grandiose should the messaging be? What happens when
reality does not live up to the hype? How can CAIV anticipate,
plan for, and mitigate the effects of disillusionment?
2. What are the challenges for crafting positive narratives that
resonate with multiple different audiences?
3. The Bush administration’s attempt to use advertising executives to
craft positive audiences was ridiculed and then dismissed; why?
4. How could the CAIV use its unique insights into motivations and
aspirations to build a series of narratives that motivate and inspire
individuals?
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Annex A: The Recruitment Handbook
The following is a condensed interpretation of the contents of an
al-Qaeda English language recruitment manual, which an ISIS online
recruiter apparently used in a prolonged recruitment effort of a lonely
young American woman in Rukmini Calimachi’s New York Times story
“ISIS and the Lonely Young American” (June 27, 2015). Although the
manual was originally an al-Qaeda document, it was apparently adopted
by ISIS online recruiters. Its full title is “A Course in the Art of
Recruiting: A graded practical program for recruiting via individual
da‘wa.” Da‘wa, literally “Call” [to Islam], may be understood here as
“recruiting.”
Before beginning to address the programmatic portion of the
course, the author of the recruiting manual provides what he refers to as
“important advice before starting the work.” The first point is to avoid
criticism of the potential recruit and to be sure to thank him or her for any
help they provide in the process, no matter how inconsequential. The flip
side of this basic point is to welcome any of his opinions even if it opposes
the recruiter’s views. One bit of advice appears to be especially helpful not
only for jihadist recruiters but also for anyone trying to deprogram the
recruit, i.e., “Don’t try to make him [the recruit] a carbon copy of yourself,
but let him keep his independency [sic], individual character, and natural
personality.” The author goes on to offer several corollaries to these basic
points. The recruiter should respect the recruit’s privacy, his family, and
even his lifestyle at least in the beginning. In short, do everything to get
know the person you are trying to recruit, but avoid giving the impression
that you are trying to recruit him or her. Therefore, in the beginning the
recruiter should avoid talking about the problems of Muslims, or
introducing the topics of al-Qaeda (or ISIS) or jihadists in general, unless
the potential recruit introduces these topics into the conversation. The
general idea is to avoid rushing things. Any decisions that the target
recruit makes must always seem to be his or hers alone. To keep the
recruitment process invisible to the target recruit, the recruiter must make
sure that the potential recruits not be aware of others in the same process.
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The recruiter must be patient. The process will take months before it
moves to the next stage.

A. Target Groups for Recruiting
The manual identifies ten different categories of potential
candidates listed from #1, “the nonreligious Muslim”, to #10, “Salafis.”
The nonreligious Muslim is preferred because the recruiter has more
leeway to teach them. It is also the category that has many young people
in it, who are the safest to recruit in the author of the manual’s opinion.
Salafis are listed last and are problematic because they have been
thoroughly educated by scholars who generally do not approve of the
radical jihadists like al-Qaeda and ISIS. The grouping is not strictly logical
or according to rank except for the first (preferred) and the last
(problematic). In category #2 are Muslims who have recently returned to
the practice of the faith after falling away. Not all categories include
people who are necessarily Muslims. For example, #3, “generally religious
people” contains individuals who have the characteristics of believers but
just need to be motivated to join an Islamic group like al-Qaeda or ISIS
and perhaps to convert to Islam first. Category #4 includes those who have
recently joined the Salafists, but are not content because Salafists are not
experienced as very active and the individual is looking to be more active.
Category #5, “the youths who live far from the cities,” does not fit into
any religious schema because the author admits they can be religious or
nonreligious. However, he adds that “They have a natural disposition for
the religion and it is easy to convince them and to shape them.” Category
#6 includes average members of Islamist groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood and various proselytizing societies, with the caveat that the
recruiter should pursue only the young members because older members
tend to be “thoroughly indoctrinated.” 66 University and high school
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The author of the recruitment manual recommends a subset of the Muslim Brotherhood (young
members) who may be vulnerable to extremist recruitment, while older members are perceived as
too set in their ways. This subset could be viewed as a potential gateway to extremism within an
otherwise legal group, especially since the ultimate goals of the Muslim Brotherhood are generally
congruent with more extremist groups, although their strategies on achieving those goals are
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students make up categories #7 and #8. The universities are full of
talented, often anti-government youth with the caveat that they are also
“full of spies.” High school students are full of potential. The recruiter
should strike up a relationship with those over age 15 because they still
have open minds, and if the jihadist recruiter does not invite them to be
religious, someone else will entice them with material goals. Category #9
appears to be the open-ended search for prominent members of society
who can have great impact but have “corrupted,” “non-Islamic” ideas. The
caveat here is that the recruiter should approach only those who have open
minds, for example, “liberals” and “secularists.”
The point of identifying these groups is to create a way for the
recruiter to think about all the people he knows in these categories and
make a first cut of those most likely to reward the time required in the
attempt to recruit them. The manual first identifies the five characteristics
that are disqualifiers for individuals in any group. The first is being a
“coward,” an obvious disqualifier for a terrorist group. The second is the
excessively talkative person. Third are those who are hostile to the
“Mujahideen,” “These are, for example, like the Murjites, “the people who
are soft with the tyrant leaders and harsh with the common Muslims....”
Fourth is the stingy person. (“Money is the backbone of Jihad.”) Finally,
the fifth killer characteristic is the loner, who “is always alone and never
tries to make relationships with people.” (“This kind is not qualified to
work with you so don’t waste your time.”) Obviously, the author
understands that the true loner can be a violent killer, but he is unlikely to
work for anyone’s goals but his own.

B. The First Stage: Getting Acquainted and Choosing
After a few more preparatory remarks, the author introduces the
first stage of the course, a general assessment of potential recruitment
targets and then choosing the ones on which to concentrate one’s efforts.
circumstantial and often include the intention of abiding by the laws of a host country, especially in
the West. It is the shared goals that argue for a group’s potential status as a gateway. In the West,
groups on the Muslim Brotherhood model have been known to adopt other names.
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In true al-Qaeda and ISIS bureaucratic form, the author provides a series
of forms for the recruiter to fill out. The first one is a simple matrix of the
names of potential targets the recruiter would have for a first cut. Against
these names are arrayed all the pertinent facts. The recruiter is urged to
think of all the people he knows or at least has encountered, and judge
whether there is a potential jihadist among them. Then he or she is to fill
in all the pertinent information about each, i.e., address, phone, job and
any pertinent notes for each. No one the recruiter judges to have one of the
“killer characteristics” should be on this initial list
The next form is a matrix of all the names from the first list
arrayed against five characteristics: Basic morals, Islamic morals,
Distinction (family, class), Closeness (to recruiter), and Stability (family,
job). The recruiter is then to give a rating of 1-10 points for the first four
categories and 1-5 for the last category. For the purposes of this exercise,
the recruiter is to revisit all the names on his list and pick two. The next
stage in the decision process is to review the choices against three
questions. These are arrayed against simple yes or no matrix. The first is a
gut check. Were you convinced by your choice? If not, choose another.
Next, did you consult anyone about your choice or pray for guidance?--a
question that translates into “are you sure?” Finally, does your choice
possess any of the killer “characteristics”? If the answers for this review
indicate a problem which cannot be resolved, for example, if on reflection
the recruiter thinks his choice actually does have one or more of the killer
characteristics, the recruiter must return to his list and make another
choice.

C. The Second Stage: Getting Close (or Approaching)
After finishing the first stage of recruitment with choices made, the
manual guides the reader into the second stage “Getting close (or
approaching).” This stage proceeds in the same painstaking fashion as the
first stage. The al-Qaeda document, revised in 2010, assumes that the
recruiter will be surrounded by acquaintances and his relationship will
likely be in person. Jihadist recruiters today are likely be acquaintances on
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social media, and the recruiter is likely to be in another country from his
or her target. In this stage, the recruiter will never mention jihad or his real
purpose. He or she will strive to strike up a friendship based on a religious
interest in Islam on the part of the target. The recruiter will strive to
become a helpful Muslim friend with long conversations and interventions
on a daily and weekly basis. The recruiter will send appropriate presents,
electronically or through ordinary mail of a religious nature or even candy.
To an experienced eye, the relationship may well appear to be grooming,
but to the target, the recruiter will appear to be a reliable friend who is
always available, always helpful, and never argumentative or judgmental.
The relationship will continue slowly over weeks or more likely months
with the target becoming increasingly dependent on the recruiter.
As in the previous stage, the course provides the recruiter with
forms to fill out to keep a record of daily and weekly activities. The
recruiter must know about the target’s “concerns, interests, and
relationships with other people and how he spends his complete 24 hours
in a day.” The recruiter must have taken note of the target’s negative and
positive characteristics and “make a long term plan to remedy” his or her
negative ones. When the recruiter has compiled enough information and
executed the plan laid out in great detail in the manual, the recruiter must
do an assessment of progress. Again the course presents a form, this time
with eight questions arrayed against a numerical rating: 1 for “No,” 2 for
“Sometimes,” and 3 for “yes.” The questions are all aimed at achieving the
goal of getting close to the target such as “Does he talk to you about his
private affairs and his hobbies?” and “Does he love to spend a lot of time
with you?” A score of less than 10 would mean that the target has received
a no on all or most questions. Obviously, the target could receive a no on
seven questions and only one “yes” and still score a 10. A score of less
than 10 means that the process has failed and the recruiter should choose
another target and start the process over. If the target receives a score from
“10 to 18” the recruiter can be satisfied of some success but must continue
the process for another month and repeat the assessment of the target.
Finally, with a score from 19 to 24, the author of the manual proclaims,
“your choice was a good one, continue with the Blessing of Allah, but you
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should know that your close relationship with him (the recruit) must
continue.”
The recruiter, however, may not continue to the third stage of the
course until he or she completes a security survey. Again the course
presents a form with three questions arrayed against “executed” and “not
executed” The course cannot continue unless the response to all three
questions is “executed,” “or there will be a danger for you.” The questions
are intended to reveal how much the recruiter knows about his recruit and
in what detail. “Did you find out how he [recruit] spends most of his
time?” “Did you find out about most of his relationships and who he
associates with?” The final question is perhaps the most ominous for the
future relationship: “Did you find out his characteristics which will soften
him up (and give you access to his heart), and did you find out his
weaknesses?” To clarify the importance of this last question, the author
provides a final form to record the positive and negative characteristics “to
benefit from them.”

D. Third Stage: The Awakening of Faith
At this point the recruiter, hiding his or her ultimate intention,
becomes a friend and mentor in faith. This means working through the
ritual practices and articles of faith in Sunni Islam. This approach is still
far from introducing the jihadist path as interpreted specifically by alQaeda, ISIS, or any specific jihadist group. However, the course
introduces ten topics to be covered, which the recruiter can rely on when
the time comes for the actual invitation to the recruit to join a group. In
this stage, the recruiter will teach by example as much as by word. So, the
first assessment following the methods employed in the earlier stages is to
determine whether the recruiter is ready or even eager “to practice what
you preach.” If the recruiter is not minimally ready to set a perfect
example as measured by the assessment, the author directs the would-be
recruiter to turn the target recruit over to “a righteous friend” who can
continue the program. On the other hand, if the recruiter passes the
assessment with a minimal grade, he may continue but should strive to
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improve his personal score as he becomes the mentor for the target recruit.
If the recruiter scores high in the personal assessment, he is urged to
“strive your utmost because this stage never ends.” The author of the
course is mostly encouraging. He notes, “If the people only accept advice
from completely righteous advisors, then we will not find any advisors
who are qualified to give advice.”
The ten topics should not be surprising to anyone familiar with
Salafist Islam and most of them would be familiar, to some extent, to any
student of Sunni Islam. These include faith in and love for Allah; yearning
for Paradise and fear of Hell; love and respect for the Messenger of Allah
Muhammad; observing all the obligatory prayer times; avoiding all forms
of sin; practicing truthfulness and sincerity; increasing non-obligatory
good deeds and prayer; and generally adopting a “beautifully decorated”
character without bad morals or manners.
Two of the topics are closer to the whole purpose of the
recruitment than the rest. The first of these describes the “virtues of jihad
and martyrdom.” The approach is intended to be subtle. This is not the
jihad of al-Qaeda or ISIS. The emphasis is on the role of traditional jihad
within Islam and the justification of jihad through the hadiths. There are
plenty of examples that the recruiter can use from the earliest days of
Islam. The idea behind the topic is to lead the target recruit to see that
jihad and dying a hero of jihad, a martyr, saves the good Muslim from the
fires of hell. The stories or examples from history can be tailored to the
personality of the recruit. The second topic, “Trials and Patience,” is a
more dangerous area for the recruiter. The recruiter needs to provide his
subject with information about the trials and tribulations of the jihad
without frightening him or her away. At the same time, the recruiter must
give his target recruit enough to think about so that he or she will not be
“shocked by the truth,” when that is revealed in the final stage of the
course. This is a topic for which the recruiter’s knowledge of the strengths
and weaknesses of the target recruit will help with shaping the message so
that it will appeal to its audience of one.
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i. Shrinking the World

The rest of this stage of the course will be consumed with practical
and theoretical lessons to deepen the target’s faith and radicalize him or
her so that the world will shrink to a dependency on this new Muslim
friend or friends. It is a stage of shared prayers, lessons, and more gifts.
The recruiter is a mentor and exemplar of the good Muslim to the recruit.
If the recruit is a non-Muslim, he or she will be encouraged to convert at
this time. If the recruit is a lukewarm Muslim, he or she will be
encouraged to deepen a commitment to Islam. The recruit will become, in
the words of the author of the course, “a stranger, but not alone.” By this
he means that the recruit will be a stranger to all the world except his new,
loving friends. His or her world will be warm with prayer, acts of kindness
(given and received), presents, shared meals, shared prayers, and works of
charity. This sharing may be via the internet or in person. His or her world
will be shrunk to one path forward. This can be a very powerful appeal to
the adolescent or young adult who is the preferred target of the course. It
may be very difficult to recover the target recruit at this point. This
process is sometimes referred to as “de-pluralization.” The target’s world
is shrunk to a single path forward, even though they may be unaware in
their initial enthusiasm.
The recruiter is encouraged to use his or her imagination and to
vary the times and the methods of training according to circumstance. The
course suggests supplying the target with commonly available pamphlets
on Islamic topics, books emphasizing the virtues of jihad in Islamic
history, and the Qur’an in translation. Appropriate videos and lectures by
well-known Muslim preachers are introduced at this point. To fill up the
recruit’s time, the recruiter should get his or her commitment to a prepared
schedule for prayer times. The candidate is encouraged to perform selfassessments for at least one month. The recruiter is required to do yet
another self-evaluation to maximize the variety of practical teaching
methods used at this stage. The recruiter should not introduce doubts at
this stage or discourage the recruit in any way. If the recruit raises
questions or doubts, answer his doubts simply using the Qur’an, hadith,
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and examples from the time of the Rashidun Caliphs, etc. As with all other
stages, the course provides a self-assessment for the recruiter and an
assessment of the recruit to determine whether he or she is ready to move
to the next stage.

E. Fourth Stage: Planting the Concepts
During this stage, the recruiter plunges deeper into the theory and
reality of jihad by introducing the basic concepts of jihadist ideology “to
indoctrinate” the candidate. The course suggests spending at least two
months at a minimum on this stage. The jihadist concepts are revealed
clearly for the first time. The first concept is holding fast to the Qur’an and
Sunna, which is true for any Sunni Muslim. However, this is explained in
a novel sense: “if anyone of the Mujahideen makes a mistake in the basic
principles of the deen [i.e. Islam], the candidate must disassociate himself
from such a wrong-doing without hesitation.” This is a variation of the
Wahhabi principle of “Allegiance and Disavowal,” i.e., allegiance to
Muslims, jihadists in this case, and disavowal of everyone else. A key
concept is that jihad and preparing for it are religious obligations. Also, if
a ruler governs by any law other than the Qur’an and Sunna, he is a
disbeliever, i.e., what is known as “Al Hakimiyyah” [sovereignty belongs
to Allah alone]. Islam as presented does not allow democracy.
Under the heading of general concepts, the candidate is introduced
to jihadist religious scholars and encouraged to be familiar with them. The
course also explains how the jihadist movement is under attack all over the
world, and this includes the media and government attacks on jihadist
scholars. The candidate should understand, however, that jihadists are all
over the world, so he need never feel lonely. If the candidate cannot join a
jihadist group (the best way), the course introduces a number of ways he
can participate in jihad without joining a group. For example, the
candidate can become one of the Mujahideen on the Internet. He can view
and share jihadist videos, join jihadist forums, etc. The first sign that the
candidate is ready to move to the next stage is that he or she requests jihad
and wants jihad. The second sign is that he or she reads jihadist books and
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requests knowledge of Islamic legislation. The author warns that the
second sign has a dangerous side to it because there are untrustworthy
legal opinions and problematic Muslim scholars. The idea is to delay
delving into this issue until the final stage. As with previous stages, the
course provides an assessment of the candidate’s performance to
determine whether he is ready to move to the last stage.

F. The Last Stage: The Establishment of the Brigade
The author states that he “will not speak a lot in this stage.” He
claims that everything the recruiter “must know” and “will want to know”
is contained in Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance.
The author intends for the course to be “a stepping stone” to al-Suri’s
book, which is the compilation of his insights and recommendations based
on his long experience of and research into jihad. This appears to be
strange advice for the reader of the English translation of the course,
which must have been originally written in Arabic. Al-Suri’s book,
completed in late 2004, is a dense Arabic composition of 1604 pages in its
PDF form. Having this book in one’s possession is a likely cause for arrest
in most Arabic speaking countries. It is a fugitive book on most jihadist
websites and only parts of it in English translation are readily available.67
The inclusion of this reference is likely the translator’s concern about
being faithful to the original author’s text, which is characteristic of
insider translations of jihadist documents. Al-Suri is known for his
theories of individual and small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines with a
special emphasis on the United States and its allies.
In this final stage, the author provides some approaches to jihad in
a practical sense. The recruiter should now “paint the scene” of this stage
as one that demands activity and preparation. The recruiter should open
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For a detailed biography of al-Suri along with selected translations of his book see Brynjar Lia,
Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008); see also Jim Lacey, ed., A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad:
Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2008); for a brief analysis of his strategy and selected translations, see also Ryan, Decoding alQaeda’s Strategy (2013), 193-254.
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the topic of jihad either in the recruiter’s country or some other country.
The recruiter should not expect that his target, who has now become his
charge, has any idea about how to go about it or prepare for it. The first
way to solve this problem is to present him with books that feature the
sufferings of jihadists at the hands of various countries. The idea is not to
make this a “source of fear,” but instead to make the stories of Muslims
who have been tortured and killed a source of anger. The recruiter should
actively engage his charge in making preparations after reviewing options.
Once again the course brings up al-Suri’s book as a source of inspiration
and practical advice. The recruiter needs to bring up examples of
successful jihadists, some of whom his charge may not know about in any
sense. Finally, the recruiter is encouraged to read al-Suri’s book and if that
is not possible at least recommended sections about recruiting,
methodology, and the “Way.” Depending on the recruiter’s situation and
his charge’s strengths, the recruiter may suggest a group, the “brigade” in
the title of this stage, which his charge may want to join. If this is not
feasible, then the two may discuss the rationale, legal justification and
methodology of performing jihad “individually.” One gets the impression
that the author cannot be more specific without knowing the particulars of
an audience he does not know. The author does not suggest the obvious
approach of seeking the advice of other colleagues that the recruit may or
may not have already met either online or in person.
In the final mobilization stage, the recruiter encourages the recruit
to join a jihadist group. For an ISIS or al-Qaeda recruiter, the recruit will
be urged to pledge allegiance to the leadership of one of these groups. The
specific action the recruiter recommends at this point will depend on the
nature of the recruit and the needs of the jihadist group at the time. The
action may be to stay in place, in which case the recruit will be expected to
become self-sustaining and perhaps become a recruiter of others in his or
her family or from among the recruit’s friends. The recruiter may provide
the recruit a one-time infusion of funds to provide for an easy start-up. If
the recruit needs to travel to a “hot jihad” the recruiter could offer the
recruit a round trip ticket to some European destination, (as in the case of
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Alex in Rukmini Calimachi’s New York Times story) where a handler
would instruct him or her on the best way to travel to the final destination.
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Annex B: The Millennium Challenge Corporation
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an innovative
presidential initiative established in 2004 by President George W. Bush.
MCC’s purpose is to help economically poor countries by entering multiyear agreements, referred to as “compacts” to fund economically
beneficial and sustainable projects. The projects that form the basis of the
compacts’ funding requests are proposed and executed by the countries
themselves without a large MCC presence in country. To be eligible for a
compact, countries must pass a series of threshold indicators
recommended by outside institutions (e.g. The World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, etc.). The
indicators offer objective measures demonstrating that a country can use
the funding efficiently and appropriately. (For details see
(https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicators) These indicators include
such items as ways to start a business and control of corruption. Because
very poor countries often cannot meet the requirements of these indicators,
MCC offers “threshold funding” to help improve selected countries’
scores. Meeting these threshold requirements often entails improvements
in a country’s financial bureaucracy and business climate, control of
corruption, and trade policy, but can include such items as human rights
and the rule of law. At the compact stage, an investment board composed
of VP level executive and chaired by the Deputy CEO makes
recommendations for funding to the CEO for decision.
According to the MCC website (https://www.mcc.gov/where-wework) oversees 47 country programs with a highly skilled workforce
projected to be 320 employees by 2019. Congressional oversight
requirements include an annual performance report that documents
country program performance data on “specific objectives and
benchmarks for measuring progress.” MCC also must report to Congress
on the cost effectiveness of its programs and maintain a rigorous
evaluation program. The cost of this effort in in the 2018 Congressional
Continuing Resolution (CR) is projected to be approximately $899
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million. The bulk of this funding ($795 million) is for economic assistance
to foreign countries. Administrative costs covering salaries, IT, overseas
operations, etc. consume approximately $104 million. MCC administrative
costs have remained relatively flat over the most recent 6 years. (Source
for budget figures: (https://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/story-cbjfy2019-admin-expenses)
The MCC Organization
The MCC workforce is distributed among six departments: The
Office of the CEO, the General Counsel, the VP for Administration and
Finance, the VP for Compact Operations, the VP for Congressional and
Public Affairs, and the VP for Policy & Evaluation. Workforce salaries for
320 employees is projected to be approximately $55 million.
Board of Directors
The MCC Board of Directors is comprised of the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, the
Administrator of USAID, the CEO of MCC and four private sector
members appointed by the President of the United States.
The MCC Advisory Council
The MCC Advisory Council provides private sector expertise,
insights, and recommendations that inform the agency’s program and
partnerships.
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